

operation and cultural exchanges with those countries but also because of the contribution it can thus make to *détente*. The prospects for such co-operation are particularly good with the Soviet Union, with which Canada shares the experience of being an Arctic country. There is no doubt that the improved climate of East-West relations and the accompanying growth in East-West contacts and exchanges have enhanced the practical opportunities for Canada to pursue these objectives. It is for Canada to make itself better known in these countries for what it is: a North American country that is not a great power, that poses no threat to anyone and that possesses vast resources, a highly developed economy and advanced technology.

The prospect that regional co-operation in Western Europe might one day produce some form of European political unity has evoked among many Canadians an almost instinctive reaction that it would be bound to work against Canadian interests, by excluding Canada from Europe and from any dialogue Europe might have with the United States; and by producing a parallel trend towards continentalism in North America in which Canada could expect ever-increasing integration with the United States. This was the "two-pillars" theory much discussed several years ago when France was shifting its position on NATO. It seems more realistic today to conclude that Canada faces a far more complex situation than the terms "united Europe" and "two-pillars" suggest. Integration in Western Europe is likely to be slow and uneven in evolving; certain European countries will wish to maintain outside interests, just as Canada will wish to retain interests outside the American "pillar". While there will be disadvantages and problems of adjustment for Canada arising out of the movement toward European integration, there are also likely to be some longer-term benefits, in particular greater stability and prosperity in Europe and a better balance within the Atlantic world.

Both these results could be very beneficial to Canada in its continuing search for countervailing factors to offset the pressure of its complex involvement with the United States. In Europe the key question for Canada may be whether it can establish a rewarding relationship with the expanding and more tightly-knit communities there. This is not to suggest that Canada's bilateral relationships with European countries will be any less important in future. They may be more necessary than they have ever been in the past—for purposes of trade and finance, science and technology, immigration and culture, peace and security. In short, for the successful pursuit of the whole range of its national objectives abroad, Canada will require a continuing network of complex relationships with individual countries in both Western and Eastern Europe.