

confusion in itself but has been the cause of more confusion in other things, more darkening of counsel, more diplomacy, than, probably, any other treaty Britain has had the misfortune to enter into.

What is the situation to-day on the French Shore? Ever incipient, never ending conflict. France makes no pretence of removing her fishing rooms, stages, buildings: the treaty says she shall do so year by year. She has appropriated certain parts of the coasts. Once in five years her merchants toss for choice of locations and fishing stations with buildings attached, and pass them from hand to hand as absolute proprietors; the treaty says she shall appropriate no land and no portion of it. She excludes the English from the portions appropriated and exercises sole rights there; the treaty says she shall have common rights only. Is there no violation of the treaty of Paris? Further, she presumes much on the disposition of the Home Government as set out in their correspondence, in the abortive convention, and is said to push her claims more rigorously when the Liberal party accedes to power. The English squatter may have no telegraphic communication, no newspaper, no literary correspondence, may be unable to read, but he can tell you with wonderful accuracy, and often to his cost, of the flow and ebb of political favour in the islands across the sea, the rate and direction of the current. French men-of-war do not hug that coast for nothing. In a word, France's attitude on the French Shore is one of aggression tempered by policy.

As regards the British situation. Years were consumed and many rebuffs received in the effort to extract from Downing Street the right of appointing magistrates and administering some form of law to the mixed population who, in defiance of difficulties, have settled on that shore, a population variously estimated from 8,000 to 15,000. Time and again, Acts to give them representation in the Local Legislature that their wrongs be righted, their wants supplied, were disallowed. But persistency has so far triumphed that you will now find magistrates with large powers north of Cape Ray, and for the first time in history a member for Bonne Bay sat last year in the Island Legislature. Newfoundland has not only hoisted the flag of "No Surrender," but is taking measures to make the French shore profitable to her.

What may we fairly expect to see done? First, the country taken possession of, opened to settlement, and industry set under rigid protection of law. Now, an Englishman may put up wharves, build storehouses, farm, invest capital, and get exit for his produce on or over the shore line, but not without fear of being called in question for trespassing on French rights, maybe, under menace of a cannon shot. Climatologists tell us that in America western are milder than eastern coasts; it is so in Newfoundland. In an agricultural point of view, the French shore is the richest part of the Island. Add to this its large deposits of mineral wealth chiefly coal, bituminous coal, and you will understand why Newfoundlanders object to a great part of their country being held any longer as a sealed book. Second, the Chinese wall which France has erected on this coast will be knocked down and through it a door of communication opened with the United States and Canada. Newfoundland will connect herself with her continent, gain access to her natural markets the nearest way, and take command of her territories.

But would not this injure France? How? With the privilege of fishing inside the three mile limit she would have on sea all the advantage she possibly could get under the treaty. As to land, her merchants would hold a much better position than now. The foundation of the peculiar condition of the French shore and of views regarding it rests on alienage, the idea that an alien is a natural-born enemy, a Samaritan with whom you shall have no intercourse, no dealings. It is a survival of antique modes of thought into a modern civilization. The nineteenth century has outgrown these notions. All civilized peoples grant, and find it advantageous to themselves to grant, aliens the same rights of acquiring, holding and transmitting property, which their own subjects enjoy. The laws of Newfoundland in this respect are not one whit behind those of her neighbours, and would give the French, in the true sense of the term, equal rights with the English, the object of the treaties both of Utrecht and Paris. Concretely, then, what would this mean to France? First, stable protection of law to her industries. Is that nothing? Her only engine of righteousness on this side of the Atlantic is volatile, a cruising war-ship, one of the sublimest works of man, noble and powerful for destruction, but, as a peace-officer—what? You cannot discharge a cannon for every cause. Second, as an arrangement between nations, France would get outside the prescription which the treaty contains, to remove her fishing apparatus yearly, no slight advantage one would think. Thirdly, a local matter which interests her merchants greatly, their properties on the French shore, which, as between themselves, are communalistic, would then be individual. Now, will they, they are turned out

of their holdings, no matter how improved, without compensation, every lustrum, every five years, and must take what the risk of a lottery turns up, as to buildings, accessories and fishing grounds, for the next term. This distribution of plant by way of rotary calabash, what is it but a damper on investments, most injurious to French industry itself? Then, they could make substantial improvements without fear of dispossession, invest money with good hope of reaping the returns, and develop their industries on a solid basis.

Instead of merely taking possession of the French shore and converting it into an English one, it is mooted in the colonial office to purchase all the rights of France in Newfoundland. What does Newfoundland desire to buy? St. Pierre and Miquelon? No. The French shore? Fisheries within the three-mile limit? Maybe. If the French feel inclined to abandon their bounty system, to give up the idea of maritime power, the negotiation may be concluded on such terms as she could or would entertain; but that is very doubtful. Further, if it were possible, would it not be a questionable benefit to remove from the island such capital as France has invested there or prevent the introduction of more French capital? What else is meant by the purchase? Suppose Newfoundland law prevailed over the length and breadth of the land; suppose the French were accorded such rights as aliens are given in other lands and prosecuted the fisheries there, what question could arise? Nothing but this: The allegiance of children born of French parents on the French shore, shall it belong to England or France? Well, the twentieth century of the Christian era is at the door. To-day, the settlement of such a matter is surely, neither beyond the competency nor the morality of the two foremost nations of the world.

Whichever plan, whatever method, seems best unto the wisdom of nations, *Carthago est delenda*, the French shore must be wiped out.

T. B. BROWNING.

TWO OF A TRADE.

BY JOHN MACLEAN.

BEFORE an audience of English freetraders Lord Lorne has been saying a good word for Canada, and in a very effective way, too. Not, indeed, by attempting to prove that Protection is beneficial, for that would only have stirred their prejudices without convincing their reason. But what he did was to present the view of Canadians as a people having a mind of their own, and firm in the belief that they can manage their own business better than anybody else can manage it for them. They insist, he said, on making as much as they can out of their own country in their own way; and are as self-willed as children of John Bull may be expected to prove. And John Bull should respect in his children that spirit of pluck, and self-reliance, and sturdy independence, which he so much admires in himself. Even were it shown that they had adopted a wrong trade policy, their right to choose a policy to suit themselves would still have to be left unquestioned. And the Marquis' hearers cheered his good-natured yet firm assertion of the right of Canadians to think and to judge for themselves, much as they dislike the way in which we have of late been exercising it. It may be added that substantially the same thing was said by Sir John Macdonald a few years ago, when he told a representative meeting of English manufacturers, flatly and plainly, that Canada's commercial system would be framed to suit her own circumstances and to promote her own interests, and not those of any other country whatever.

Our late Governor-General puts the case for Canada in such a way as almost to disarm free trade criticism, while appealing effectively to the national respect for people who are independent enough to think for themselves. None the less, however, will Englishmen continue to look upon ours as an "anti-British" tariff, maintained by the Dominion for its own special benefit, but to the injury of the Mother country. They will do this for reasons which they have in their minds, but which will not bear being stated in public. By what we may call the commercial instinct business men among them feel that Canada is gaining by her National Policy, and that some part of her former custom has been lost by somebody. But this they cannot say in public, for that would be to admit the success of Protection, which they cannot under any circumstances afford to do. And yet our tariff is not an "anti-British" one after all, as the word is generally understood; for, while bearing heavily upon imports from the United States, it bears very lightly in comparison upon imports from Great Britain. Statistics for the last eight years—the four next before and the four next after the change of 1879—show this most incontestably. With- out, however, on the present occasion marshalling in long array the figures