

proved that Beauregard subsequently asked Guertin if he were not the man whom he met on the bridge, thereby admitting that he had been on the bridge the night in question.

Nine days after Charron disappeared, a friend of his who lived in the same village went to St. Hyacinthe, and ascertaining that Beauregard was the last man seen in company with deceased, sent for him to a tavern, treated him and asked him what became of Charron. The reply was that he did not recollect. The other then said: "One of the policemen saw you and the deceased together; he spoke to you and you answered him." The policeman was sent for, and repeated this statement in the presence of Beauregard; but the latter on being again requested to state what he had done with Charron, reiterated that he forgot. This refusal to answer obviously raised a presumption of guilt.

We now come to the motive assigned for the crime. On the Tuesday preceding the disappearance of Charron, Beauregard had applied to the municipal authorities for a tavern license, and had been refused. He then said that if he had money he would get a license, and on the Monday following, he stated that he had now money enough to get one. Besides this, there were other proofs that he had come into possession of a sum of money.

The body of deceased was found about a month after the murder, at a distance of 15 or 18 arpents from the bridge. On the temples were contusions, and the injuries were stated by the medical men to be multiple, produced by repeated blows, and might have been caused by blows of a skull-cracker, such as Beauregard was proved to have carried about with him. The inference was that the murderer, after inflicting repeated blows on the head of his victim, had thrown him from the bridge into the river. On the body was found altogether only \$24, shewing a large deficit in the sum which it was proved that Charron had received on the day of the murder. There was no proof that he had made any payments during the day, nor were any receipts found on his person.

There was some additional testimony of a direct nature given by one Lusignan, a man of ill reputation and a drunkard, who had been made a confidant by the murderer. Very slight importance was attached to this evidence by the Court, and therefore we need not dwell upon it. He stated, however, that Beauregard confessed to him that he had burned certain notes on foreign banks which he had taken from the person of his victim, and it appeared from other evidence that Charron had received such notes during the day.

The trial, which took place at Montreal, in October 1859, before Hon. Mr. Justice Aylwin, extended over a week and caused considerable excitement. The Jury found the prisoner guilty, and he was subsequently executed before the Montreal Jail.

RIGHTS OF DISSENTIENTS.

An important decision has been rendered at St. Johns, by Mr. Justice Sicotte, as to the right possessed by a non resident proprietor in the disposition of his school taxes. The action was brought by the School Commissioners of Lacolle against William Bowman, of St. Valentin. The defendant is the owner of property in Lacolle parish, on which he refused to pay taxes to the Commissioners, claiming the right to apply the amount to the support of the dissentient schools. The Commissioners contended that as he was only a proprietor and not a resident, he was not allowed by law the privilege of dissenting. Judge Sicotte has decided in favor of the defendant: holding that it is the manifest intention of the law, whether the proprietor is or is not a resident, that he should have the right to dissent in the payment of his school taxes.

The following is the summary given by the Journal of Education of this judgment, and of the conflicting decision rendered some time ago by Mr. Justice Short:—

"The question is, whether a non-resident proprietor can or cannot legally declare himself a dissentient.

"The reasons on which Judge Short based his judgment were, if we recollect rightly, as follows: 1st. The word *inhabitant* can only mean a resident, and the law in giving the *inhabitants* forming the religious minority the right of dissent, had in view *residents* only; 2nd, had it been intended to extend this right to non-resident proprietors, a clause to that effect would have been inserted, or the word *rate payer*, which occurs elsewhere in the same Act, would have been employed; 3rdly, the right of becoming a dissentient is purely personal and exceptional, and should not be exercised except within the strict meaning of the law. The object which the latter has in view is to allow the minority of a municipality to send their children to such schools as they shall approve of,—a reason which does not apply to non-residents, who are not supposed to have any children within the municipality.

"The reasons on which Judge Sicotte's judgment rests may be summed up thus: 1st. The word *inhabitant* does not (in the legal and administrative sense) necessarily signify *resident*. Many authorities are cited to show that in the legislation of England and Canada the words *inhabitants* and *proprietors* or *land-holders* are looked upon as synonymous terms. 2nd. The