was unanimous, lays down sufficient to justify the judicial suggestion for further law making. Osler, J., at page 536 (after citing *Armstrong* v. *Canada Atlantic R. Co.* (1902), 4 O.L.R. 560, for the principle that what constitutes reasonable excuse is not defined and depends on circumstances) adds in effect that it not easy to lay down a general governing principle and that where there are actual knowledge and verbal notice, as elements of excuse, there still remain questions of great nicety.

Some of the cases in different provinces, illustrating the difficulties and perplexities experienced by the various Courts in the different law districts of Canada because "reasonable excuse" has never been defined, are subjoined.

The failure of an employee to give notice of an injury within the time prescribed by sec. 4 of the Alberta Workmen's Compensation Act of 1908, ch. 12, is not fatal, unless the omission is prejudicial to the employer: *Bruno* v. *International Coal & Coke Co.*, 12 D.L.R. 745.

The employee's ignorance of the fact that he was entitled to compensation for injuries is not a mistake that will excuse his failure to give notice thereof in the manner required by sec. 4 of the Alberta Workmen's Compensation Act of 1908, ch. 12: *Bruno* v. *International Coal & Coke Co.*, 12 D.L.R. 745.

A notice of injury given by a workman is sufficient to entitle his dependants after his death to the benefits of the B.C. Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1911, ch. 244, without any other or further notice: *Moffatt* v. *Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co.*, 12 D.L.R. 643.

The statute in Quebec requiring notice of action against a municipal corporation was not enacted to allow corporations to escape liability on technical grounds, but to enable them by investigation to come into possession of all the facts; so as to either compromise or properly prepare the defence: *West* v. *City of Montreal*, 9 D.L.R. 9.

An action brought against a municipality for personal injuries from negligence in the operations under way for making repairs to its streets, but not due to any defect in the condition of the street itself, is not within the Ontario Municipal Act, 3 Edw. VII. (Ont.) ch. 19, sec. 606, so as to require a preliminary notice of injury: *Waller* v. *Town of Sarnia*, 9 D.L.R. 834.

Where a statutory enactment in Quebec required notice of suit to be given to a city corporation before an action in damages could be instituted, such notice in the absence of any contrary stipulation may be given by the plaintiff's attorney and may be validly served by bailiff: *City of Westmount* v. *Hicks*, 8 D.L.R. 488.

A defective notice, or even no notice at all, in British Columbia is not a bar to action if it is proved (*a*) that the employer is not prejudiced in his defence, or (*b*) that the want or defect was occasioned by a mistake or other reasonable cause: *Mitchelli* v. *Crow's Nest Pass Coal Co.*, 7 D.L.R. 904 at 907.

Where in British Columbia the injured party was laid up with the