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"burden-sharing" if it means that U.S. allies should do more so that the United States can do less? How realistic is it — whether justified or not — for the U.S. to ask its allies to maintain or increase their defence budgets to cover pre-existing U.S. responsibilities — something the United States is unwilling to do? The point is that the limits of "burden-sharing" may already have been reached. Thus, unless the United States itself is willing to allocate existing or greater budgetary sums to defence projects, these projects are likely to be downgraded or eliminated by default.

As far as Canada is concerned, the primary impact of "burden-sharing" is not that Canada should do more; rather, it is that Canada should not do less. In other words, the "burden-sharing" conception could tend to increase U.S. diplomatic resistance to Canadian reductions in joint defence activities.

The U.S. Government is not unaware of the trend toward East-West *détente*, a trend for which it is largely responsible. Nor is it unaware of the stability of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance, the irrationality of a deliberate attack, and the emergence of a multipolarity in the international system — trends that are noted in the Canadian defence White Paper. However, U.S. optimism over these developments is rather more restrained than that of Canada. Above all, the United States is of the opinion that these developments took place and may proceed only so far as the United States deploys and maintains a level of strategic forces sufficient to ensure the credibility of the Western deterrent. And the only way this credibility can be maintained is for the U.S. to continue to have a second-strike strategic capability.

Détente vs. deterrence

Nor would the Canadian Government disagree with this U.S. analysis. The focal point of possible Canadian-U.S. divergence revolves about the question of how much emphasis should be placed on deterrence and how much on *détente*. The United States, as a nation having profoundly international interests and the primary responsibility for ensuring the credibility of the Western deterrent, not surprisingly places a greater emphasis on deterrence than *détente*. Canada has a lower level of capability, international interests and international responsibilities than does the United States. It is, therefore, not surprising that Canada tends to be more concerned about itself as a united and prosperous nation than its role in either deterrence or *détente*. However, Canada is concerned

about the impact of deterrence and *détente* on the stability of the international system, so far as this stability affects its goals of unity and prosperity. In this light, it is interesting to note that, since the late 1960s, Canada seems to have been placing an increasing emphasis on *détente* rather than deterrence.

In discussing differing Canadian and U.S. approaches, it might be well to note the following: Those divergent Canadian-U.S. attitudes that do exist are not based on a difference of intelligence data. Because Canada has shared in U.S. and British intelligence efforts since the middle 1940s, this is not surprising. In fact, very seldom does Canada challenge U.S. intelligence data. However, it is in the evaluation of this intelligence from the standpoint of motivations and risks that divergent Canadian-U.S. attitudes may occur. In evaluating these data, the United States tends to regard capability and risk as synonymous, while Canada does not. Thus, if the United States concludes that the U.S.S.R. has 140 heavy bombers, it is axiomatic that these bombers constitute a net threat to North America — or, in other words, an increase in the risks to be faced by the U.S. Canada is less categorical, both concerning the validity of U.S. interpretations of Soviet motivations and U.S. responses to perceived external threats.

It is within this context that Canadian and U.S. officials are again grappling with such considerations as the degree of concurrence in their assessments of the air threat to North America and the necessity of air-defence modernization in meeting this threat. It remains to be seen whether 1973 will be, for NORAD, the culmination or continuation of an era of joint defence, or a hiatus pending further study.

Whatever the outcome, it is encouraging to note that the rhetorical curtain shrouding Canadian-U.S. divergent attitudes and interests seems to be lifting. The Canadian-U.S. interaction is by now sufficiently mature to acknowledge the fact that it is just as important to examine the limits of Canadian-U.S. common interests as it is to emphasize a consensus of purpose. For, indeed, the Canadian-U.S. interaction is a dialectical combination of both ingredients. It is through a realization of this that NORAD's ambivalent symbolism can be translated into a viable policy option. But, then, this is merely another way of saying that the considerations involved in the negotiations over NORAD's renewal must be grounded in the realities of the Canadian and U.S. national and international experiences.

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