ON NOVEMBER 6, Bernard Lortie, alleged member of the Chenier cell, is arrested.

On November 9, Maintenance Minister Jerome Choquette holds a press conference to tell the underworld it should not fear that the special powers granted the government by the War Measures Act will be used against it. The underworld is reassured.

On November 11, Father Charles Banville, cure of Saint-Paul-de-Matane (Gaspésie) states, "The great majority of the population and the priests of Matane and Matapédia ridings agree with the FLQ manifesto!"

A few days later, the member of the National Assembly for Matane (Gaspesie) advocates the restoration of capital punishment, a compulsory ID card, a very strict control of demonstrations, censorship of the press, TV, movies, the cleaning-up of colleges and universities, a strict ideological training for all teachers and professors and compulsory military service.

THE POLICE STICK UP POSTERS of Marc Charbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, Paul Rose, and Francis Simard with a reward of \$150,000 for anyone giving information leading to the arrest of these individuals.

On November 25, at the coroner's inquest into the death of Pierre Laporte, Paul Rose's sister, Lise, refuses to testify and cries out how the police stripped and beat her in her cell. The judge condemns her to six months' imprisonment for contempt of court.

The Provincial Police threaten to go on strike over the criticism of their conduct by some of the politicians.

On December 3, an apartment in number 10,945 on rue des Recollets in Montreal-Nord is surrounded. The LIBERATION cell holding Mr. Cross there negotiates his release and its own safe conduct to Cuba.

Jacques Lanctöt, his wife and child, Jacques Cossette-Trudel and his wife, Marc Carbonneau and Yves Langlois leave for Cuba on an RCAF plane and Mr. Cross is set free.

On December 28, Paul Rose, Jacques Rose and Francis Simard are arrested in a farmhouse near St. Jean and accused of the murder of Pierre Laporte.

THE STATE APPARATUS considers it has the guilty ones behind bars and can now start easing the hold of repression while at the same time trying to plaster over the cracks of its public image.

A few hundred 'suspects' are gradually released while the better-known ones are accused of membership in an illegal organization and seditious conspiracy.

It is now the turn of the judicial arm of the state apparatus to fight those who question its order. The accused accuse the judges and Crown attorneys. The judges fight back with contempt of court charges, expulsions, in-camera sessions and adjournments.

With its image tarnished, the judicial apparatus finds a way to free Chartrand and Lemieux on bail, though Paul Rose is prevented from even attending his own trial.

The reigning order is defending itself while the Quebecois are thinking things over.

History is in progress.



Separation — peaceful or violent?

Since the cessation of the October '70 crisis and the defeat of the Parti Quebecois in that province's provincial election, it might appear that the question of separation is dead. The political party that favored a peaceful separation failed to win a majority and the guerilla force that had this country in such an uproar of fear and speculation has not been heard of (at least on a large scale) since.

There are several questions to be considered in this respect: Is it possible to have a peaceful separation, or is violence the only alternative? Will the separation (if it comes) be total or basically political and symbolic? Is the Front de Libération du Quebec dead or merely dormant, solidifying itself for another eruption?

It would seem to be obvious that a peaceful separation is in many ways feasible and desirable. No one really wants a revolution unless it is necessary. However, even supposing that peaceful negotiations were entertained, would they be able to continue for any length of time without breaking down?

The only way this could be accomplished would be in a symbolic separation. Such a change would most likely be acceptable to English Canada. Their major interest lies in the economic aspect of Québec and the value it holds for the rest of the nation. Presupposing it came to that and the Parti Québécois (or a similar organization) had their way, can one assume that the people of that province would meekly accept such a thing? The problems of Québec are mostly economic in nature and will remain unsolved after a "token separation". Can it be taken for granted that, after so many long years of struggle, the FLQ and/or other revolutionary organizations will retire quietly to the rear?

It seems highly improbable that an organization such as the FLQ, which has submerged three times in the past decade and always re-emerged more powerful, is through playing its role in Québec's struggle. Last year a few were captured, but those that escaped can hardly have given up the aims, struggles and ambitions of a lifetime.

Can there be a peaceful separation? Probably not. If the demands of Québec are to be met, the federal government will have to relinquish total political and economic control. This they will not be allowed to do by the other provinces. In addition, pressure will come from the vested interests in the United States and England, both of whom have control and a major source of income in Québec.

There will be attempts at conciliation (no doubt honest ones by those who fear the results of a civil war), mild threats and warnings not so mild. Someone will have to concede. The battles which ended in 1759 showed that the French and English cannot live harmoniously in Canada — one must have control. If English Canada gives in (which borders on the ficticious) there is a beginning. If Quebec loses, it is only a matter of time before the entire scene must be played again.

The struggle in Québec has existed for centuries and has been growing. It will probably continue to do so until the people of that province feel that they are their own masters. Essentially it matters very little whether

a separation is economically feasible for Québec. Could they survive, even with aid from France? Could they win a civil war with English Canada? For the Québecois it cannot be a matter of what can be done but of what must be done.

The only solution that would seem to be available to the rest of Canada is one that necessitates the missing link — understanding. If we can learn to understand the Quebecois as a people instead of a collection of \$ signs, then an agreement might be reached. The sad part of it all is: Perhaps we have forgotten how to understand; perhaps the Quebecois have forgotten how to be understood.

