

4. This brings us right back to the position at the Geneva talks of 1958,<sup>23</sup> neglecting the USA “big hole” theory,<sup>24</sup> which was always mathematically unproven. The modifications which have taken place since then have been essentially political – the substitution of a “sampling” technique for on-site verification, for example.

5. It seems to me that any compromises must be in the political field. If Canada and the neutrals, for example, could accept the fact that explosions under an agreed detectable limit don’t matter anyway, then there would be a basis for compromise. But I cannot believe that they could now say this; and I am not sure that USA and UK would accept it – certainly USSR would not unless the neutrals did.

6. USA and UK have now compromised so far on the original proposals that the scientific basis of the proposals has now almost lost its integrity. To push them any further would be to destroy it entirely and, I’m afraid, to subscribe to the philosophy of the baseball coach who said “nice guys finish last.”

7. Any possible solution lies in the political, not the scientific field.<sup>25</sup>

A.K. LONGAIR

35.

DEA/50271-M-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d’État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le sous-secrétaire d’État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], May 9, 1962

CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR ON MAY 9

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me at his request on the 9th of May. He had asked to discuss the situation at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva with me before I left for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens. The conversation was mainly concerned with the Geneva Conference. However, not unexpectedly, the Soviet Ambassador started the conversation by fishing for information on the NATO Meeting. I merely drew his attention to the communiqué which he had read and pointed to the emphasis which the communiqué contained on continuing the negotiations on disarmament, nuclear tests and collateral measures at Geneva and the exploratory talks on the Berlin question at Washington. He observed that the Soviet Union would be troubled by the references in the Athens communiqué to the sharing of nuclear information. This seemed to indicate a further dissemination of information about nuclear weapons and what he described as a threatening attitude, which would be regarded as provocative by his government. I said that there was no evidence from the communiqué or any other source that further dissemination of weapons was involved in the decisions taken at Athens; as for the question of “threatening attitudes” there was no evidence of that either in the Athens communiqué. I also recalled that the Soviets had broken the moratorium on nuclear tests and made threatening statements over Berlin.

<sup>23</sup> Voir/See Volume 24, document 140 n. 103-104.

<sup>24</sup> Voir/See Herman S. Wolk, “Scientists, Politics, and the Bomb,” *Air Force Magazine* Vol. 45, No. 10 (October 1962), pp. 44-48.

<sup>25</sup> Note marginale :/Marginal note:

Left by Gen. Burns with SSEA Athens 6/5. R. C[ampbell]