

Supply—National Defence

States, it is more than likely that certain targets in Canada would be attacked by bombers although the primary threat would be from ICBM's.

Well, that is a pretty sobering statement of the threat that confronts us, all the more sobering because, as the minister pointed out later in his statement, there is no defence of any kind at the present time against intercontinental missiles. I repeat that there is no defence of any kind. The minister has said previously and he indicated this morning that a defence is being sought against intercontinental missiles, and I think he said in the house—I do not want to do him an injustice—in answer to a question some time ago that this is likely to be secured soon. He was a little more specific on that point when he said that the Nike-Zeus, which is the United States anti-missile missile, would be operational in the near future.

No such claim as that has been made in the United States that I have been able to ascertain. On the other hand, a recognized authority, though I admit one who holds very strong views on one side of the question, Admiral Hayward, has said that the best we can hope for in regard to defence against missiles would be 50 per cent effectiveness by 1965. I certainly hope he is wrong when he says that the best we can hope for is 50 per cent effectiveness by 1965 against intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles.

What about our defence against bomber attack? The minister has said in the past, and he is right, of course, that some will get through. Some bombers always get through. How many would be needed for destruction?

Another example of what I call the unrealistic approach to the Canadian aspect of the problem, and which I have ventured to call bluffing in some of its manifestations, was the announcement, which has a bearing on defence matters, especially defence against missiles, that Canada will soon be launching a satellite of its own, giving the impression that we are moving into the nuclear outer space field, an impression which has very little basis in reality as we were able to find out from the Prime Minister when we questioned him about it. He admitted at that time that the satellite will be of American construction, that the propulsion will be American, that it will be launched from the United States and that it will have some Canadian instruments inside. There is no doubt that they will be important, but that hardly justifies giving the impression that we were going to launch a satellite which no doubt would be the forerunner of the kind of defence which the United States may be seeking, either by counter-offensive or by direct defensive, against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

[Mr. Pearson.]

Another example is in the way the CF-105 contract was cancelled. Perhaps this would be a good time for me to call it one o'clock, Mr. Chairman.

At one o'clock the committee took recess.

AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at 2.30 p.m.

Mr. Pearson: Mr. Chairman, at one o'clock I had mentioned the cancellation of the CF-105 contract as an indication of the lack of policy on the part of the government. We have had some time now to examine the reasons for that cancellation, and have secured more information on the way the cancellation was brought about. While I do not, on this occasion, propose to go into this matter I cannot forbear from saying that the information we have now received, and which we have had time to examine, increases our worries about the way this matter was handled.

We have had information since the first announcement, for instance, that the actual cost involved in the production of this aircraft varies from the information we received at the beginning. We were told by the Prime Minister on February 23, as recorded on page 1299 of *Hansard*—he was referring to the advice he had received from the chiefs of staff—that this aircraft would to all intents and purposes be obsolete by the time it became available for squadron service. We know now that the CF-100, which this aircraft was to have replaced and which if the CF-105 was to be obsolete would be even more obsolete, if that expression can be used, is to be retained for our home defence squadrons. We know also something about the Bomarc which is to replace two of the squadrons.

Everything we have learned, Mr. Chairman, confirms and indeed intensifies our criticism of the government on the way in which this matter was handled. This criticism was expressed in very strong terms in an article in *Toronto Saturday Night* of May 23 by one Robert Jamieson who, I take it, is a Canadian resident but only recently arrived in this country. In this article he states:

Two thirds of the workers on the Arrow came from Britain. It was Canada's business whether she went on with the Arrow, but people in Britain are accustomed to seeing their governments looking at issues in the round and working out broad solutions in the light of all probable consequences before announcing decisions. Does any Canadian seriously suggest this happened when the Arrow was dropped? I believe that the inept handling of this issue will have greater and more lasting