

*External Affairs*

said Japan is the first and northernmost point, then Okinawa, then Taiwan, then the Philippines. If the United States have come to the conclusion, as they apparently have, that any threat to southeast Asia may come from communist China it is reasonable that they should try to establish such a line of defence. It is understandable that they should help and contribute to the armament of Japan so that it may ensure its self-defence. It is not surprising either that they made of Okinawa the strong arsenal it is at the moment. I am not revealing any secret when I describe Okinawa as a stronghold and evidently the formidable base from which could start any retaliation in that sector, action as envisaged by Mr. Dulles. It is known that the Americans have spent hundreds of millions on its defences.

The next natural base is Taiwan. To leave an empty unused space between Okinawa and the Philippines would be unthinkable if we carry on from the same premise of the potential attack from the north.

How can the U.S. recognize communist China and yet maintain bases on Taiwan that is under the control of the legitimate government of China that was expelled from the mainland. If Taiwan is part of a first line of defence how can you turn your back to the Chiang Kai-shek government. When we come to consider the Chinese problem we realize that it is more complex than most people seem to realize.

One should not lose sight of the necessity of stopping bloodshed in Indo-China as it has been stopped in Korea and the only people we can talk to in this regard is the *de facto* government of the mainland, the one controlling the forces we have to fight.

The problem of recognizing China seems to be quite acute here. I did not think it would be considered of such serious importance as was demonstrated by the speeches from two parties of the opposition side of the house. I believe we must be somewhat more philosophic in looking at such things and we should take lessons from history. I do not believe we should sacrifice any of our principles, but, on the other hand, it may also be practical to look at these things from day to day and do what we can if we want to save lives in Indo-China.

If we want to prevent further bloodshed whether it be in Indo-China or Korea it is better to keep an open mind. The time may come some day and soon when we will have to talk to these people and face them across a green table.

We must however maintain a prudent attitude until we have evidence, if we ever get

[Mr. Picard.]

it, that communist China and Soviet Russia have changed their attitude as far as expansion abroad is concerned. I, for one, as I stated earlier in these remarks, am of the opinion that their present tactics appear to be different and that we may yet reach an acceptable compromise that will ensure a peaceful *modus vivendi* to southeast Asia.

No one should be too dogmatic about a complex situation resulting from the split of sovereignty over Chinese territories. The government recognized by most nations is still the one that was prevailing on the mainland until the communist victory, when it transferred its seat to Taiwan. The government ruling *de facto* on the mainland is the one that took power through the help of Japanese material handed over to them by Russia upon the fall of Japan, but no matter whether it was through the stupidity of puritanical American advisers who cut short all help to Chiang on the pretext that all was not well in the treasury of the Kuomintang administration; whether it was through the mushrooming strength of Mao whose victory over the war lords meant more men available for enlistment in his army; or more generals hastening to climb on the bandwagon while the going was good; whether it was due mainly to help from Soviet Russia or from the acquisition of Japanese materials which fell into the hands of the Russians after the fall of Japan and which they handed over to Mao.

On the other hand, you cannot turn around and say that the people in Taiwan are bandits and that you do not want to deal with them either. I venture to say, though it might not please everyone, that when the role of Chiang Kai-shek is considered by historians the complaints that some of his followers may have used public funds will be of small importance. He will be remembered as the man who unified China through the success of his many campaigns against the war lords, and the one man who really effectively set up a central administration at most points in that vast country except in those areas controlled by Mao's armies supported from Moscow.

I believe many hon. members in this house would be interested in a book written by Hollington Tong, a prominent Chinese writer who is now ambassador in Japan. It may be said that being a supporter of Chiang he is biased but I think it is a fair appraisal of the generalissimo and would enlighten many on this period of Chinese history.

Whatever weaknesses the Chiang administration might have shown in some parts of the mainland I believe Chiang will be recognized as the champion of a different approach