

BUILDING THE NEW EUROPE

"If 1989 was the year of revolution, 1990 marks the beginning of a decade of reconstruction."

Rt. Hon. Joe Clark

Secretary of State for External Affairs

We began the previous section on the unification of the Germanies by quoting the words of the German foreign policy analyst, Michael Sturmer, that "all this is repair work of the cold war." It is certainly that, but it is a great deal more besides. In addition to the repairs, we are now launched on the design and construction of wholly new structures for East-West relations, new to the point that the very term East-West takes on an entirely different meaning. The walls, both physical and psychological, dividing East and West must now be progressively dismantled so as to open up rooms of common interest. Unless this occurs, it may prove impossible to complete the repairs of the cold war, let alone build new structures.

We were struck by a remark made by the Foreign Minister of West Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, when he appeared before the Committee in April. In response to a question about the various options for reforming NATO, he remarked: "Blueprints are what people think the future could be but I think we are now on the right way in our negotiations." Accepting the distinction between designs for the future and a clear sense of direction, the Committee's purpose here is not to add to the list of blueprints but to offer our thoughts on the goals that should guide this work. As we see it, there are two main long term objectives in building the new Europe.

Cooperative Security

The question of a united Germany in NATO may prove to be a very hard nut to crack in the 2+4 talks, as the results of the recent superpower summit would indicate. The Soviet Union has steadfastly refused to accept the proposition, arguing either for participation of a united Germany in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact or a neutral Germany. Neither of those options seems very practical or attractive, the former because the Warsaw Pact appears to be dissolving, the latter because it would isolate Germany by leaving it in a kind of security no-man's land. Failure to resolve this issue might result in another unsatisfactory outcome, namely the indefinite maintenance of 350,000 Soviet troops on East German soil.

We would not rule out the possibility that some creative, ad-hoc arrangements might satisfy Soviet concerns and that they would then accept a united Germany in NATO. There