

it will be the cause of further tensions, not an instrument for their reduction.

It follows from the requirement for adequate verification that a degree of openness must be agreed upon. Openness is not only necessary to permit verification, it is necessary to build and maintain confidence, an essential ingredient to the arms control and disarmament process. This call for openness is not an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, it is rather an attempt to dispel suspicion and mistrust, which are encouraged by tight secrecy in all military-related subjects.

If one accepts that the negotiation of verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements is the most effective route to achieving lower levels of armaments with undiminished security, which agreements should be the goal? The Canadian Government believes that negotiation related to nuclear weapons should be given priority, and I would like to use this occasion to reaffirm the validity of one of the main proposals put forward by Prime Minister Trudeau at the first special session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978.

The Prime Minister expressed his particular concern about the "technological impulse that continues to lie behind the development of strategic nuclear weaponry". This, he said, governs "national policies (that) are pre-empted for long periods ahead"; current intentions are inferred "from military postures that may be the result of decisions taken a decade earlier". Such considerations, he said, suggest "that stable ... deterrence ... the basis for the preservation of peace and security between the nuclear powers and their allies today ... remains an inadequate concept".

He then proposed a "strategy of suffocation", the main elements of which are: a comprehensive test ban treaty, a ban on the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, a ban on production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes, and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems. These elements were not new to the arms control discussions. What was new was the concept of their interaction in combination to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons among heretofore non-nuclear weapons states or the nuclear weapons states themselves.