

is baptized," be interpreted to mean, that *believing* is in all cases an essential pre-requisite to baptism; then that other expression, which is also in the commission, "he that believeth not shall be damned," if interpreted on the same principle, must mean, "Believing is in all cases an essential pre-requisite to escaping damnation: but infants do not believe; therefore they will certainly be damned." Every man ought to be prepared to take the logical consequences of his own principles. Are those persons, then, who deny baptism to infants, because they are not believers, prepared to adopt the horrible conclusion to which this principle logically leads? Observe, we do not charge them with actually holding the opinion that infants will be damned; on the contrary, we know that their whole nature instinctively revolts from the horrible notion. But we do charge their restricted interpretation of our Lord's commission with leading logically to this conclusion. Let them point out the flaw in the reasoning, if there be one. But if, on the contrary, the connexion between the premisses and the conclusion be logically sound, let them, for the sake of consistency, as they abhor the conclusion, give up the premisses which clearly warrant it.

Our opponents, however, hold very firmly to the words in the commission, "He that *believeth* and is baptized," and maintain that they leave no room for infants, as they sanction only the baptism of *believers*. Dr. Carson says, "I would gainsay an angel from heaven, who should say that this commission may extend to the baptism of any but believers." But let us try the *practice* of such men as Dr. Carson by their own avowed principle. Do they, then, really and practically hold that no baptism is valid unless the subject is a believer? A man presents himself for bap-