

we have a large empire of colonies and dependencies, and that France has a considerable empire of the same kind, while Germany's share appears to be small and inadequate. This hunger for possessions on the earth's surface is of comparatively recent growth. It has been steadily increasing during the last five-and-twenty years. It should be remembered that Bismarck did not desire colonial expansion. That was one of the points on which he differed from the young Kaiser. It is instructive to follow the process of development. The first thing that Germany desired was unity. It had been handicapped in the past by its territorial divisions. It was a very legitimate and worthy aim to get rid of these divisions. The work was done in a masterful and impressive way. It was only natural that with the consciousness of unity there should come also a consciousness of strength, and the desire to assert that strength in paying off old scores and establishing a German Empire on firm foundations. Hence the Franco-German War, from which Germany seemed to have gained much that it wanted. But it very soon came to be disappointed with the result. France recovered, with remarkable and unexpected rapidity, and still continued to be a formidable rival. The determination gradually grew to fight out this battle again and the next time—this time—to fight it to a finish. There is abundant and overwhelming evidence of this determination. General von Bernhardt lays it down in plain words :

‘ In one way or another we must settle accounts with France if we are to gain elbow-room for our own world-policy. That is the first and most absolute requirement of a sound German policy ; and inasmuch as French hostility is not to be removed once for all