

*Supply—National Defence*

particular operation or mission is of an extended nature.

This is the philosophy of mobile command and it is being organized in such a way that a single commander will have the responsibility for the whole mission, for the training of the group, for exercising them in different component blocks, for having with them the support elements which may be required to be extracted from time to time and made available for United Nations operations, for training them in such a way that they are ready to respond with the least delay, for having a ready force which is always available to go anywhere in a matter of hours' notice, a company at least with an almost instantaneous reaction time, a battalion with a very short reaction time and then an air portable brigade with a very fast reaction time.

This is the philosophy and this is the reason the force is being mobilized in this way. This is the reason that the force is being equipped because if we are going to maintain an army on the scale which I think is right under present circumstances, we believe that having learned the lessons of pre-world war I and pre-world war II it is right and correct to maintain a force in being of this modest size. And if it is worth keeping, if it is worth paying the cost of maintaining it, then certainly it is worth providing the equipment. Then, having done that, it is not effective at all unless it is possible in this modern world to take it where it is required and when it is required within a reasonable time frame.

This is not easy. My hon. friend was quite right when he said last night that this is not yet accomplished. No one claims it is accomplished. It has just been organized and now it is starting out on its task. When the Standing Committee on Defence meets I shall be glad to bring before it the officers who were responsible for evolving this particular organization who will explain in detail the units of which it will be composed, the reaction time which we hope to achieve, the equipments that are needed in order to make it effective, the whole concept of mobility, how these forces will be working together under one command and at the same time from which one can extract any block or unit which is required to meet special circumstances.

So far as my hon. friend's question about the tactical air force is concerned this is, as he suggested, an addition. This is another arm. This is extra firepower. This is more effectiveness because these airplanes can do things artillery cannot do. It is to round out

the force and give it greater capability to operate under the various environments that we envisage. It does not increase its mobility. The object of the exercise, and this is all we intend to meet, is that the air arm will have as good and probably better mobility than the ground force it will support. That is all that is required for the concept we have in mind. We will be able to move the ground elements and the air support simultaneously so that they are ready to go into action in either peace keeping work or a limited engagement.

There is no guarantee for all time that it will not be necessary for our defence forces to engage in some limited emergency. If that is a possibility, even a remote possibility—my hon. friend will remember it has happened several times in the last half century—then the object of the exercise is to learn from the mistakes of the past.

Last night my hon. friend was interjecting things about Hong Kong and he also mentioned Sam Hughes. He might have mentioned the problem of the Ross rifle, the problem of training soldiers with broomsticks and a lot of other things which one can recall to mind.

**Mr. Nielsen:** Like horses on the payroll.

**Mr. Hellyer:** Yes, horses on the payroll. That is right. There are a lot of things that could be recalled to mind, but surely there are some things that ought to be learned from the lessons of history. If my hon. friends opposite think they are the wrong lessons from history, then let them tell us.

**Mr. Churchill:** Will you answer a question, Mr. Minister?

**Mr. Hellyer:** Of course.

**Mr. Churchill:** Did you observe the fact that last night I pointed out that in 1954, which is a long time ago, I outlined the mobility required for a brigade in Europe? It is not a new idea on your part at all and yet you have not fulfilled that obligation.

**Mr. Hellyer:** I want to make it very clear that I do not claim credit for the idea.

**Mr. Churchill:** I am sorry, I thought you did. I beg your pardon.

**Mr. Hellyer:** I do not claim credit for the idea of tactical mobility and flexibility. I do not even claim credit for the idea of integration and unification or any of these things. Some of these ideas are 20 or 30 years old.

**Mr. Churchill:** This humility is refreshing.