

between national security and national destruction. This statement was made in the *Argus* on May 9, 1946. These reactions to the news that the imperial government were leaving the Suez canal were reported before it had been made clear that the dominions had never been consulted.

I noticed in the reading room that the *Daily Express* of May 18 last summed up the situation in the following brief comment:

Liquidation

Suez canal—jugular vein of the British empire.

India—heart of the empire. Imperial preference the blood stream of the British empire.

Danger to any one would be grievous to the empire's structure.

There was also the abandonment of British preference. I have been trying to find out what the stand of Canada was, but in vain. These three blows have come from within and not from without our empire, all three were unnecessary, and danger to any one will be fatal to the empire structure of the future.

The empire, I say, is at the parting of the ways. I have mentioned India, where there is a mischievous commission at the present time. I say further that the maintenance of Alexandria as a British base was a safety line for the whole empire, and the action taken was not necessary.

I wish to say a word about the empire parliamentary association, to which this parliament contributed \$25,000 last year. For many years it did most useful work, but I am sorry to see that at the meeting at Bermuda the delegates attended too many golf matches, scenic trips, scenic tours, banquets, luncheons and teas, garden parties and all that kind of thing, and failed to carry on their good empire work. It turned itself into a pan-American affair and forgot all about the empire, in my opinion as an old member of the empire parliamentary association, Canadian branch.

We are about to send someone over to the peace conference. As I have said all along, Britain and the dominions will have little or nothing to say in the peace conference if the dominions do not stand together. But for the dominions the mother country would have lost the war. The dominions must hang together or they hang separately, because none of them is able to go it alone.

It is well known that the division of Europe was agreed to at Yalta and Moscow by the big three. They would not allow France in. Mr. Churchill, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Roosevelt were at Yalta, and Mr. Byrnes, Mr. Stalin and Mr. Attlee at Moscow.

[Mr. Church.]

The division of Europe was agreed to at Yalta, Moscow and Paris. It was practically decided there. The biggest mistake of the San Francisco meeting was the granting of veto power to any one of the big three or the big five nations. The veto power simply places all the power under the control of three nations, the senior allies. They were opposed to admitting France. Russia objected to it. France will always be a great nation. She is an ally which Great Britain must have for defence, and Britain will need all she can get to have anything to say over there. Unless the dominions stand together at Paris they will hang separately. I am opposed to any change in the union jack or in appeals to the privy council. The privy council has proved itself to be one court where a litigant gets justice.

A few years ago in an external affairs debate I suggested we should have followed the practice of appointing governors general from among some of our great generals. The appointment of Field Marshal Viscount Alexander is a splendid one. I also suggested Field Marshal Montgomery. Field Marshal Alexander and his charming wife have won the admiration, respect, affection and love of the people of Canada in so short a time.

The matter of empire preferences is one of the most important matters that we have to decide at the present time. I am not one of those who believe in what one of our members said concerning Lord Keynes and his work. A recent editorial in the *National Review* says:

In spite of his excellent brain he was handicapped, for he had no faith in the future of the empire, nor indeed any urge to stand by it. This lack of faith, this pessimism showed all through his life. He did not fight for his country when he was a young man, and when he was older he did not appear to rely on the essential qualities of his countrymen. He could work for them, but he could not believe in their future. This attitude of his did us immense harm in Washington.

I have pointed out all along that we have surrendered too much of our financial, military, social and economic initiative to Washington. And that was done in connection with the matter I am speaking about, imperial preferences and Bretton Woods. "Many Americans felt that they need not consider the empire when England's principal negotiator disbelieved it," says the *National Review*. It continues:

Added to this, he was accompanied to Washington by a crowd of superior young men, economists, professors and others who made an indelible and deplorable impression upon all who saw them and heard their haughty and highbrow voices. We make a great mistake when we send such representatives abroad. We cannot make ourselves popular in the United