

in the ENDC have stated that their countries were in favour of arriving at an adequately verified test ban. On the other hand, both the United States and the USSR continue to carry out nuclear tests underground while Communist China and France are testing in the atmosphere. The ostensible obstacle to the early conclusion of a CTB is the lack of agreement on what constitutes "adequate verification." As the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, stated at the 332nd meeting of the ENDC this year, the obstacle is simply that "one side is upholding the theories that on-site inspections are necessary to ensure no violations occur; while the other side reiterates that national means of detection and verification are satisfactory and that no on-site inspections should be prescribed." There is, fortunately, a more optimistic side to this last problem. Progress is being made and various countries, such as the United States, are carrying out extensive and active research programmes, the result of which will, hopefully, yield completely instrumented verification methods which will be generally acceptable. It is the Canadian position that such research must be continued and that the information so obtained should be shared internationally. Indeed, as I said in a statement at the ENDC, such an interchange of information and ideas could well contribute to the spirit of mutual trust and understanding necessary to facilitate agreement on the political aspects of a comprehensive test ban. To this end Canada has played and continues to play an active role in the so-called seismic detection club which Sweden originally suggested and which was endorsed in resolution 2032 (XX).

Very much related to the question of a CTB is the continued development and production of ballistic missiles both offensive and defensive. The development of such weapons virtually by definition involves some nuclear or thermo-nuclear testing. We are particularly concerned at this time by the decisions of the USSR and the USA to develop and deploy anti-ballistic missile defences. To our regret we must say that these decisions announce another expansion of the spiral in the nuclear arms race.

It may seem reasonable for any country to take all the steps it considers necessary for its national security--in this case the installation of ABMs--but we must remember that, in addition to the expenditure required to provide the desired protection, the protection itself in this case could well upset the balance of deterrence with incalculable results. The most likely result, however, would be another round in the arms race, involving the further development of both defensive and offensive missiles. And what does this produce? Only wasteful expenditure on a massive scale with little or no added security to the countries engaged in this deadly competition in destructive power.