

from this neo-neo linkage. The third, its value in highlighting, in these terms, the inherent limitations of the Australian debate set, as it undoubtedly is, within the narrow confines of neo-realist and neo-liberal images of the world.<sup>9</sup>

These limitations have been usefully analysed by Steve Smith who has confirmed the 'neo-neo' debate as an updated variation on a Westphalian state-centred theme but with two more important contemporary characteristics. The first, the tendency "to restrict debate to the prosperous nations of the West and take for granted... many features of this globalised world". The second, the tendency to "support US interests".<sup>10</sup> These are traits traditionally very evident within the Australian foreign policy perspective. They remain very evident in the 1990s at a time when, as indicated above, they could well have dangerous and paradoxical consequences for Australia's future if their utility is not critically reviewed in the context of a Westphalian model which, for all its silenced dimensions, continues to provide a "simple, arresting and elegant" image of the world which "orders the minds of policymakers".<sup>11</sup>

The first section of this paper is concerned to provide a critical framework for such a review by acknowledging, at least briefly, the influence of this Westphalian legacy in terms utilised by K.J. Holsti in 1985, in his commentary on the breakdown of the "three-centuries-long intellectual consensus which organized philosophical speculation [and] guided empirical research" for the great majority of IR specialists in the contemporary era.<sup>12</sup> The consensus Holsti speaks of here is that derived from the events at Westphalia in 1648 (or a particular representation of them) which by the mid-1980s was under a variety of challenges aimed, principally, at the most powerful articulation of the Westphalian model, power politics realism.

A decade or so later these challenges have proliferated and become more focused with the onrush of globalisation and the increasingly obvious anomalies now associated with realist perspectives on IR. My concern at this point is less with these anomalies per se but more with the process by which consensus was reached on a model of international life in the first instance. It is in regard to this process, I suggest, that many of the traditional and contemporary problems of orthodox IR

---

<sup>9</sup>For a discussion of Australian foreign policy in this context, see M. Sullivan, "Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse: Policing the Asia-Pacific" in G. Cheeseman and R. Bruce eds, Discourses of Danger op. cit. 1997; and J. George, "Australia's Global Perspectives in the 1990s: A Case of Old Realist Wine in New (neo-liberal) Bottles?" in R. Leaver and D. Cox eds. Middling, Meddling and Muddling: Issues in Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1997)

<sup>10</sup>See S. Smith, "New Approaches to International Theory" in J. Baylis and S. Smith eds. The Globalization of World Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) p.171

<sup>11</sup>See S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia", op. cit., p.115

<sup>12</sup>See K. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, op. cit. 1985 p.1