

information, offer unofficial good offices, and make further recommendations to the CSO regarding action to help the parties resolve their differences. It was hoped an independent figure of a sufficiently high level to command respect in all quarters, working quickly and confidentially, would avoid shortcomings caused by the CSCE's more cumbersome plenary procedures. Since the High Commissioner's support was to come from and his briefings to go through the ODIHR, the post brought human dimension issues firmly into the conflict prevention and management sphere.

Political Management of Crisis

In the second stage of the hierarchy, the Helsinki Document outlined and coordinated the institutions, mechanisms, missions and political consultative processes the CSCE had already established. The CSO, acting on behalf of the Council, would have overall responsibility for managing crises. It could set up frameworks for negotiated settlements, dispatch rapporteur or fact-finding missions, or initiate good offices, mediation or conciliation missions. In a move that proved to be of pivotal importance to the CPC's future, the Document extended the CPC Consultative Committee the authority to send rapporteur or fact-finding missions, a procedure used during the FUM in the case of Serbia-Montenegro. In a move to regularize and encourage responsible use of missions, agreement was reached that all participating states should share their costs, which had previously borne on volunteer basis.

Operational Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management

In addition to mention of fact-finding and rapporteur missions, the Helsinki Document conflict prevention and management menu culminated in procedures for CSCE peacekeeping as a complement to political processes. Here the FUM broke new ground. The CSO could launch a peacekeeping mission to supervise and maintain ceasefires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid or to assist refugees while efforts to find a political solution to the conflict continued. The Document was clear that peacekeeping must be conceived as a complement to, not a substitute for, a peaceful settlement process. Three conditions had to be met before CSCE contingents could be sent: 1) the existence of an effective and durable ceasefire; 2) a written agreement between the CSCE and the parties concerned; and 3) guarantees by the parties regarding the safety "at all times" of the personnel involved in the operation. Such peacekeeping operations would be carried out under a clear political mandate from the CSCE. However, they could be supported by the resources of regional organizations such as the EC, NATO, the WEU and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The text on peacekeeping was difficult to develop, reflecting differences among traditional peacekeepers (Canada, Norway, the Central and East Europeans, and neutrals) who wanted simple, clear rules that would be pragmatically flexible; the EC, which was attempting to address larger CSCE structural issues via peacekeeping; and the US, which did not see the need for spelling out in such detailed language the conditions under which CSCE peacekeeping could be conducted. Lengthy and contentious discussions focused on the roles of various CSCE institutions in the chain of command, the conditions under which peacekeeping missions could be formed and dispatched, and the role to be played by other