

ANNEX A

8	Develop an early warning system for internal conflicts: assumes preventive diplomacy and even arms embargoes might be used.	* A good idea in principal but a note of caution. If done by regional or global organizations, it could be seen as meddling in the internal affairs of other states. It must not be seen as a North-South issue. Perhaps there is a role for NGOs and other organizations. It should include good offices assistance for conflict resolution.	5
9	Develop ways of tracking weapons through international manufacturing standards..	Implied here is the cooperation of weapons manufacturers. As this involves sovereignty and commercial issues, it may prove difficult to address.	2
10	Publicize the problems associated with the proliferation of light weapons. Political, policy and popular. Includes education of governments and populations..	*This can be done through various international agencies, governments and the media. Transparency is also a factor.	8
11	Create anti-light weapons task force and commissions -international and regional.	This is partially addressed through UN Res 50/70B. It also relates to recommendations from the International Commission on Rwanda. ⁸²	3
12	Aim for a treaty to regulate all light weapons transfers.	At best this is a long term goal.	1
13	Ban certain types of light weapons.	*This incremental approach appears to be making progress in the case of anti-personnel mines. If not banning certain weapons, then at least severely circumscribe their transfer and use.	3
14	International norm to condemn and or control destabilizing light weapons transfers. Included here would be black listing states with bad human rights records or making aid contingent on suitable light weapon controls.	This can also be associated with serial 10. Of course no state destabilizes an area, all arms transfers merely contribute to area stabilization!	5
15	Ammunition controls and restrictions	While this has some potential, proposals merely to ban or prevent production, sales and transfers of common types of ammunition are unlikely to gain support to the extent that it would be effective. Targeting specialized or unique ammunition such as white phosphorous or certain types of anti-aircraft missiles might. This approach is suitable for states individually or collectively through an international supply control regime.	5

⁸² UN. *Interim Report of the International Commission on Rwanda*. S/1996/67, 29 January, 1996.