(Mr. Beesley, Canada)

It should be noted that this handbook does not deal with the procedures and criteria leading up to the initiation of an investigation. This issue is still very much a subject for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. The focus of this study is on what investigators should know and do when called upon to implement a decision to conduct an investigation, including the procedures that might be followed and the equipment that might be needed.

A technical working paper dealing with the identification of chemical substances will soon also be tabled in the appropriate Working Group by the Canadian delegation. That paper proposes a method for identifying chemical substances based on Chemical Abstracts Service registry numbers, which could be of considerable utility in reducing ambiguity in the identification process and in helping to simplify and standardize eventual data flows relating to the implementation of the convention, taking full advantage of computerized methods now available to search chemical literature.

In addition, as mentioned in my earlier statement, we will also be distributing an indexed compendium of all chemical weapons documentation for the period 1983 to 1985 to assist delegations in their work.

In this context I would like to commend the delegation of Pakistan for the serious efforts it has made in addressing in a recent working paper, the first one tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons this year, some of the central issues in a future chemical weapons convention. We have noted in particular the statement in the paper that chemical weapons use should be treated as a most serious breach of a future convention. The Canadian Government shares this view.

In out optation, the most effective way of averting the threat of chemical weapons is hy their comprehensive ban within the framework of the convention which is currently being negotiated in the Conference. The initiatives which are geographically limited, like the creation of chemical-weapon-free source in some regions, can be useful as confidence-building measures, hat cannot replace a comprehensive han. As a significity of the 1925 Protocol, Yugoslavia has always peen willing to consult with all interested parties on how best to contribute to a conversionsive han on chemical weaponer