

Unilateral action through military force will never be accepted by this community, but neither will the flagrant abuse of human rights...

The CSCE framework also offers us a way of dealing with conflict — not simply resolving conflict but, more importantly, preventing conflict.

Canada continues to believe that the best conflict prevention mechanism is the implementation of our commitments. To enhance that, we need other tools.

Early warning through the Committee of Senior Officials, the Office for Democratic Institutions or the High Commissioner is essential, but we must respond promptly once we have been warned. We must be prepared to dispatch fact-finders or a good offices mission to sit on the ground and work patiently to bring parties together before they get too far apart...

We also need the means to interposition forces, before or during a conflict. Canada has been a leading force in developing CSCE peacekeeping. Our credentials on this issue are, I believe, beyond question.

Some months back we said we needed to reconcile the ability of the CSCE to create security with NATO's ability to provide security. I believe we have finally done it.

The Helsinki Document gives us the political mandate for CSCE peacekeeping. The procedures in that document, coupled with the willingness of regional and transatlantic organizations to support our efforts, give us the means. This is an important step forward in giving the CSCE the operational ability it needs to take action.

It also gives life to the notion of the interlocking elements in European security. Not simply the CSCE and NATO, but the European Community, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe all contribute to our security blanket.

Protection for minority rights, effective conflict prevention, a positive security forum — these are all keys for the 1990s.

The drafters of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act have indeed been vindicated in the comprehensive approach they took to security so many years ago. Canada strongly believes in the enduring validity and importance of the CSCE.

Our challenge now is to translate the unique political and moral authority of the CSCE, which we struggled so long to establish, into effective machinery to manage our problems. ■

CFE Enters Into Force



Canadian CFE inspectors in Poland in October.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) entered into force on a permanent basis on November 9, following the deposit of instruments of ratification by the last of the 29 signatories. In view of the Treaty's importance, and faced with only minor technical delays in ratification by some of the newly independent states on the territory of the former USSR, CFE States Parties had earlier agreed to a provisional entry into force effective July 17.

On that date, signatories began the first phase of Treaty implementation, namely the 120-day baseline validation period. During this period, each state was obliged to accept a number of inspections equivalent to 20 percent of its declared objects of verification. An object of verification is essentially a military unit, such as a brigade or an air wing holding Treaty-limited equipment (TLE), or a TLE storage site. Canada was one of the first CFE states to initiate its program of on-site inspections, visiting units in Russia, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Georgia.

The Canadian program was coordinated with NATO partners to ensure that inspections by Allies provide a reasonable basis for determining that all signatories fulfill their Treaty obligations. NATO members conducted 238 inspections during the baseline period and were subjected to 128 in-

spections by teams from non-NATO countries. Non-NATO states conducted an additional 17 inspections within their own group.

The Canadian inspectors found no anomalies and the majority of inspections carried out by NATO members were similarly uneventful. The most significant exceptions occurred immediately after the August 14 exchange of new information on military forces, at which time Russia tried to curtail inspectors' access by redefining the boundaries of military facilities in a manner incompatible with the Treaty definition. Following high-level demarches to the Russian government by other States Parties, inspector access was restored to the levels permitted by the Treaty.

During the baseline period, several CFE parties that are required to destroy or convert military equipment began these procedures on a small scale. Now that the baseline period is over and the three-year reduction period has begun, states will intensify their destruction efforts. Twenty-five percent of the final reduction target must be reached by November 13, 1993, with the remaining excess equipment to be destroyed or converted by November 1995. Opportunities to inspect such procedures and their results will keep Canadian inspectors fully occupied during the coming months. ■