

The argument thus sketched is clear, consistent, steadily progressive, and (on the premises assumed) conclusive.

Were it not for Stallbaum's extraordinary comment, I would consider it unnecessary to say anything regarding the logical propriety of the interchange (C) of the terms holy and God-loved. We must distinguish between a judgment in which one thing is merely predicated of another—as "God is good"—and a definition exhibiting the full and exact nature of the thing defined—as "a triangle is a three-sided figure." In the latter case, wherever the expression *triangle* occurs, we may without error replace it by *three-sided figure*: and conversely. But of course such a procedure would in the former case be absurd. Now Stallbaum actually argues that the passage under consideration, without some such addition as Bast has suggested, involves a fallacy, inasmuch as, the holy having been defined to be the God-loved, *δσιον* and *θεοφιλες* are thereafter treated as interchangeable terms! How could the learned critic forget that the proposition, "holiness is that which is loved by the Gods," is taken, throughout the argument, not as the mere predication of a quality which may belong to other objects as well as to holiness, but as a definition exhibiting exactly the essential nature of holiness? A passage of the Protagoras may be referred to by way of illustration. Protagoras had been led to identify *the pleasant* and *the good*, so as to make the proposition, "the good is that which is pleasant," a definition exhibiting the exact nature of the good. He had also asserted that men often do evil, knowing that it is evil, in consequence of being overcome by pleasures. Here Socrates takes him up, and insists that *pleasure* be replaced by *good*, according to the definition which had been given of the latter term; which being done, the doctrine of Protagoras is reduced to this: that men often do evil, knowing that it is evil, in consequence of being overcome by good. ἡ γελοιον λεγετε πραγμα, εἰ πραττει τις κακα, γιγνωσκων οτι κακα εστιν, ου δεον αυτα πραττειν, ηττωμενος ὑπο των αγαθων.—(Protagoras, § 111. Bekker.)

It may be observed, that, while endeavouring to prove that morality (more precisely, holiness) is not dependent on *the will* of God, Plato does not represent it as independent of *the nature* of God. In fact, in his maturest dialogues, as we may afterwards have occasion to point out, he connects all eternal and unchange-