

with good-nature and good-will. She was eager to be generous, and could afford generosity. *We* might appreciate the sentiment better were we not the victims of it ; we should like it more if we felt it less.

For if at this moment, free as she was to act, and with immense forces at her disposal, she had resolved to retain her territorial conquests as a compensation for the cost of the war, there can be no doubt that, at the present day, the Province of New Brunswick would have extended to the Penobscot, and the Canadian Pacific Railway would have been some 1,500 miles the shorter.

The improvident concessions of 1814 threw us back upon the provisions of the Treaty of 1783, which, so far as they related to the north-eastern boundary, were, in the language of the King of Holland's award, "inexplicable and impracticable." The words of the Treaty, if they meant anything, meant self-immolation—an act of national "hari-kari" for the special delectation of the American public. This was clearly impracticable and inexplicable, and a Treaty which could bear such misconstruction was no Treaty at all. It was a mutual misunderstanding, and both parties agreed to view it in that light, so far as related to the boundary between New Brunswick and Maine ; but the re-opening of the question was attended by evil auguries. The popular feeling in the United States was adverse to retrocession. It was desperately resisted in the American Senate. It involved the still greater family question of State rights. Maine raved like a maniac, and was ready for a free fight with all creation. She defied England, ran a muck at Canada, and shook her impious fist in the face of her own maternal Government. The two countries were brought to the verge of war. The immediate danger was stayed by the personal intervention of the great peacemaker—a well-deserved and honourable title—General Winfield Scott. These perilous complications were cleared up and closed by the Ashburton Treaty, of 1842.

It must be owned that under the critical circumstances of the time the Ashburton Treaty did all that could be done. It gave us a boundary shorn of the American pretensions, though by no means equal to our just rights, as proved, subsequently, by the production of the celebrated Franklin or

"red line" map ; and it gave us peace, and the satisfaction of knowing that New Brunswick had made great sacrifices "for the good of the Empire." While upon this subject, it is but fair to state, in explanation of the course taken by Daniel Webster, that although, doubtless, the Franklin or "red line" map, discovered by David Sparks in the *Archives des affaires Étrangères*, at Paris, was in his hands during these negotiations, this piece of evidence was not conclusive. It afforded strong presumption, but not absolute proof, of the correctness of our claims under the Treaty—claims, however, which we had abandoned when we abandoned the Treaty itself and accepted an arbitration. Nor could a public Minister or a private advocate be expected to make out his adversary's case ; but one thing is now certain, that the presumption raised by the "red line" map was employed by Daniel Webster, in secret conclave, to moderate the formidable opposition of the Senate, and to overcome the intractable violence of Maine ; and that it secured peace between the two countries at a moment when harmony was additionally endangered by the Canadian revolt and its consequences, by the cases of the *Caroline* and the *Creole*, by the right of search question, and by the hostile attitude of the French press and the French people, in those days periodically afflicted with Anglophobia.

Nor can the famous expression, "shameful capitulation," of Lord Palmerston pass altogether unchallenged. It came ill from the mouth of one who, in 1833, had rejected a compromise which, if accepted then, would have foregone all need of capitulation in 1842. In 1833, May 28, General Jackson, with that sincere love of peace which actuates all statesmanlike soldiers, made a proposition to the British Government, through Mr. Livingston, his Secretary of State, and Sir Charles Vaughan, our Minister at Washington, which, in the reprobatory language of Albert Gallatin, one of the oldest diplomats and ablest statesmen of America, was denounced "as a proposal to substitute for the due North Line another which would have given to Great Britain *the greater part, if not the whole*, of the disputed territory. Why the proposal was made, and why it was not accepted," adds Mr. Gallatin, "cannot be otherwise accounted for, so far at least as regards the offer, than by a com-