

possible eventualities; and were such detailed views laid before the subordinates; they would only become confused, because they are not able to judge which of these eventualities would suit the case in point.

Nothing should ever be said in a written order concerning a possible retreat. Such orders fall into too many hands, and at the moment when all should endeavor only to gain the victory, the troops ought not to imagine that their leader is occupied with thoughts of retreat. Such orders, when necessary, should be given verbally. In an order every word not absolutely necessary is an evil. Orders covering a sheet of foolscap take up too much time to read, and still more time to understand; the criterion of a good order is simplicity and clearness; let one word only be struck out, and it ought to be unintelligible. Should this not be the case, then the word struck out is one too many, hence useless and pernicious.

Every leader must consider well what information he has to impart to his divisions, and what to withhold. Orders in circular form, which are advantageously used in peace time, should be avoided in the field. If certain and rapid receipt is to be desired, as many copies of the order as there are commands to which it should be delivered, should be prepared.

The bad selection of a staff quarter has been proved to cause very unnecessary delays in war, and often lamentable results.

Either the General commanding the Division, or his general staff officer should always be present in the staff quarters; both being absent at the same time is highly improper. Should any important orders, reports, or questions be necessary during their absence the Adjutant of the Division would not be in a position to issue the necessary instruction, since, as a rule, he would not be aware of the general state of affairs, or of the intentions of his Commander.

In general the place of each Commander is with the main body of his troops.

As a rule the Commander-in-Chief can only issue his orders after he has received the reports of the occurrences of the day from the several corps.

It must always be made known where the General of Division is to be found, so that reports may be able to reach him.

With regard to the train of a Division, the led horses belonging to it will follow immediately in rear, and it should be strictly enjoined that they should not be turned into pack horses, so that in case of need they may be mounted immediately.

As a rule the munition wagons remain with the train of the Division.

The ammunition wagons, when they are attached to the divisional train, belong to the regiment. Partitioning of the same to the Artillery Division, separately or united, is inadvisable.

The pack horses, baggage wagons, field forges, regimental staff wagons, and the carts of the chief staff follow the rear of the division.

The Pioneers at hand should never be allowed to be too far distant from the heads of the column of march. A single road bridge broken down would bring the whole Division to a stand. The repair of a bridge cannot be too quickly taken in hand with all the exertion of command.

The detail of a Van Guard is—

- 1 Battalion
- 1 Squadron
- 2 Guns

1 Company of Pioneers.

In an open country such a guard, formed

of all arms of the service, is generally unnecessary when there is a strong body of Cavalry in front.

The troops in the main body of the advanced guard are so arranged that those are in front who would be the first employed were the enemy to be met with. Should the Van Guard experience an obstinate resistance, so that the main body is obliged to interpose, in such a case also the Artillery should endeavor as much as possible to prepare the attack. The Artillery however cannot lead the head of a new division; it therefore follows in rear of the leading battalion.

When a mountain chain is between two marching columns, it can never be certainly reckoned upon that a fight which is going on in one valley will be heard in the other valley.

But if a communication exist, the detachment sent over the mountains by the column which is not engaged can essentially aid the other, especially if it should come up in the rear of the enemy.

Flanking parties of Infantry could not follow the march of the columns over the mountains. They would soon be left behind even if they set off at the same time as the advanced guard, on account of being obliged to go up and down hill, and there being no path. Flank-covering in this manner, when the borders of the valley are not very favourable, can only be carried out by means of branch columns when parallel valleys are to be found. If this be not the case and if cross valleys open out from which the enemy can approach the line of march, detachments must be sent up as covering parties, which eventually will join the tail of the column.

It is most strongly to be recommended that bodies of troops, not of the same party, who are in a position parallel to, or behind one another, shall above all things, keep up an uninterrupted communication.

*All forming up of troops is to be avoided unless the nature of the case absolutely requires it.*

In order to rest the men, a simultaneous halt of the column of march is all that is necessary; each such successive drawing up is a preparation. But this should not be done on the mere possibility of an engagement, but only when such is inevitable, and then not till the advanced guard has been arrested on its forward march. Where, it is advisable to form up, depends chiefly upon the enemy, and on this account it cannot previously be determined on; it is also dependent on the nature of the ground and peculiar circumstances; but the ground must be of such a nature as to render it possible, and it forms the line of demarcation, in rear of which it is the intention to fight, or the battle field on which the attack is to be made.

In the last case the forming should not take place so soon, because the advance in deployed order takes up considerable time and fatigues the troops. If the advanced guard shall have taken up a position which is at all tenable, then it will be more advantageous to preserve the column of march up to that point. If, however, the object of the march is to be attained without fighting, the troops should only be drawn up when they are compelled to do so.

Every superior officer on a march should see his troops defile before him at least once a day, in order to control the march discipline, and especially to observe their general appearance.

If the enemy is not in the vicinity, so that it is not necessary for the leader to be with

the body of the troops constantly, an inspection of this kind may be extended to the baggage and trains, otherwise every kind of irregularity will go on.

Special attention should be given to the times at which the march is to take place. He who rouses up the men unnecessarily as a rule, overlooks the fact that a large body of men like a Division, when its several bodies are separated by long distances, cannot all be set in motion at the same time, and thus the troops are tired out by assembling too early. Whether the troops may have a hard days work impending, cannot be known beforehand; therefore we should be more scrupulous in avoiding all that is unnecessarily fatiguing.

The art of command does not commence with bodies of troops which come especially into relations with the General Staff—such as the Division or Army Corps—it should be exercised with skill acquired by practice by every leader, even the lowest.

And this is a matter of such intense difficulty, that too much pains cannot be taken to acquire it, and in constantly practising that which has been learnt; therefore the study of its rules should be commenced at the moment the young officer first begins his education in the mode of leading troops.

#### BIRTHPLACES OF BRITISH REGIMENTS.

It was suggested to us not long since, that as the localization of the army appeared nearer accomplishment than at any other period of its history, a short notice of the earlier local associations of particular corps might be acceptable to some of our readers to whom such information is not readily accessible.

This suggestion we now proceed to act upon, availing ourselves of some memoranda for the accuracy of which we believe we can vouch.

The household regiments, as unlikely now to be affected by any local arrangements, and the regiments of the Dragoon Guards, which were originally made up of independent troops of garrisons raised in all parts of the country, and which, consequently, cannot be said to be connected with any particular locality, have been omitted.

The memoranda commences with the Dragoons:—

The First (Royal) Dragoons were originally an Irish corps—"Horse Grenadiers of Ireland"—they appear in very early lists. Of the nationality of the Scotch Greys nothing need be said. The Laird Hussars were raised in Middlesex, Herts, and Essex; the Fourth, in the West Country. The original Fifth Lancers—Royal Irish Heavy Dragoons, when first raised, the Sixth Enniskillens, and the Eight Hussars have always been Irish. The Ninth Lancers came from the West of England, the Tenth Hussars from Herts, the regiment having been formed at Hertford. The eleventh Hussars were raised in Essex, at Chelmsford; the Twelfth Lancers at Reading, being recruited in Berks, Bucks, and Hants, but for seventy consecutive years afterwards they were continually stationed and recruited in Ireland. The Thirteenth Hussars were raised by the Midland Counties and Cheshire; the Fourteenth in the North of England; the Fifteenth—Elliot's famous Light Horse—in the neighborhood of London; the Sixteenth Lancers, at Northampton; the Seventeenth, at Coventry; the