

consists. Were political economy an art, it would instruct individuals as to what they ought to do. Being a science, it is essentially an exposition of what men at large do—of what we find them doing with a general and calculable uniformity; and also of the results of what they do, which are equally uniform and calculable. And although it is connected just as closely with morality as astronomy is with the art of navigation, it is no more the business of economic science, as such, to inculcate one kind of morality rather than another kind, than it is the business of the Astronomer Royal or the compilers of the Nautical Almanac to regulate the course of international trade, or preach sermons to navigators on the comparative morality of sea-ports.

So much, then, for the general looseness of thought by which Ruskin's attack on economic science is vitiated. We will now turn to the more important of his detailed contentions. We shall find that these are vitiated in exactly the same way.

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The most important of these detailed contentions which I propose to examine are as follows: those which refer specifically to labour; those which refer specifically to capital; and those which refer specifically to the process of "getting rich" (in the ordinary acceptance of the phrase), to which Ruskin makes constant reference. But I will begin with saying a few words about another, which, though second to the above in its intrinsic importance, is highly instructive as an illustration, not of his methods only, but of the methods of many distinguished moralists who resemble him.

In order to show that wages are actually capable of being regulated without reference to fluctuations in the abundance of labour and the demand for it, he appeals to the case of the army, where the system for which he pleads is in operation before our eyes. In the soldier, he says, we have a perfect