

whether or not repeat not in the light of actual experience during the interim period the provision for obligatory on-site inspection should be retained.⁴⁰

5. I should be grateful for your early reaction concerning the advisability of modifying on the above lines the suggested settlement which Canadian delegation would work for behind the scenes.⁴¹ Tsarapkin's statement in the sub-committee this afternoon as well as neutral interventions in plenary may provide further indications as to the most promising approach. In the meantime the outline of the remarks I now plan to make at Friday's plenary follows in a separate message† and your early comments on it are requested.

[E.L.M.] BURNS

52.

DEA/2462-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
à l'ambassadeur en Union soviétique*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Ambassador in Soviet Union*

TELEGRAM S-455

Ottawa, November 28, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your Tel 809 of Nov 9.

POSSIBLE MEETING WITH KHRUSHCHEV

On basis of past experience we suspect that in any interview with Khrushchev the Premier will control course of dialogue. Should the opportunity present itself there are, however, a few matters which I hope you will have opportunity to raise.

2. The major question which we wish you to discuss with Khrushchev is disarmament and cessation of nuclear tests. Subject to your judgement as to trend of the conversation, you should base your remarks on the points set out below:

(a) As Khrushchev is aware, the Canadian Government, like his own, considers disarmament and a permanent cessation of nuclear tests to be among the most important questions facing the world at the present time. The urgency of achieving this goal has been made more apparent by the recent experience in Cuba because it brought to the surface the fact that one of the principal causes of continuing international tension is the reliance placed on military strength rather than stable international agreements. We believe that both Khrushchev and Kennedy have drawn the correct conclusion from the crisis situation in emphasizing the need for disarmament and settlements in other areas of East/West dispute.

(b) It is clear that there is now a greater need than ever for firm evidence that disarmament negotiations are not an empty series of verbal exchanges and that real progress is possible. This is fundamentally a psychological problem – if governments and ordinary citizens are to sustain their efforts toward the goal of disarmament, they must have some concrete indication that it can in fact be realized in the foreseeable future, and is not merely an aim piously proclaimed by governments for their own reasons.

⁴⁰ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

This is a very strange line of thinking. [K.D. McIlwraith?]

⁴¹ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

Try to gain British support first. [K.D. McIlwraith?]