

brought into contact with them; these officers know more of their captains than do the rank and file; they again are brought into contact with officers of higher grades, until the staff of the Commander-in-Chief is reached. It is certainly not too much to say, that if a private soldier wished to know something of the temper, aims, character, capacity of his commander, he would rather trust the opinion of the members of that commander's staff than his own infrequent and fortuitous observations:—Is it not so in the political arena? Leading men in most communities come frequently in contact in the mart, or on the exchange, or committees for this purpose or that, and in society. They see each other upon other occasions than when soliciting votes for parliamentary or municipal honors, and they can form unbiassed opinions as to the character, aims, motives and calibre of those whom they meet thus. Each of these has more or less co-laborers of a lower social or commercial grade, whose interests are one with his own;—and if he approve himself trustworthy, they learn to trust him; and so the ramifications extend down and down to the electoral base of the community. It can hardly be doubted that if the original electors' body—having selected certain men for *other than electoral* purposes, were to allow them to act on their behalf in the choice of representatives for the Dominion Parliament a much wiser choice would be made than is oftentimes made by the electors themselves; who are often called upon to choose between two candidates, totally unknown to them except by repute, and what is repute at such times but an artful admixture of adulation and slander.

Now to recapitulate; what has been the general drift of our argument so far as we have gone?

1. That by the facts of history as also by analogy we are led to conclude—that it cannot be predicated of any particular form or mode of Government, or of any particular set of constitutional usages, that they are absolutely right and fitting, in themselves, or that they are even desirable, in every stage of National progress, in every state of society. They must be in harmony with the social forces which dominate the people; and that consequently any effort to frame the governmental institutions of a country upon a preconceived plan, and without due regard to the nature, habits and conditions of its people, must end in discomfiture and dissatisfaction on the part of the governed, or feebleness on the part of the governing body.

2. That history and analogy, likewise lead us to conclude that the persistent tendency of all intelligent peoples is towards self-government; which can only be had through the instrumentality of representatives, ultimately amenable to the will of the electoral body.

3. That the Central Executive body of a free people should not be so constantly dependent upon the Legislative body, as to rob it of vigor, and promptitude of action, or originality of design.

4. That the establishment of Provincial Governments under the British American Act was rather a compromise, effected by political parties, than a requirement of the Canadian people, or the natural development of their nature or instincts.

5. That the Governments so referred to, are a bar to the creation of any thing like a healthy national sentiment.

6. That they demand the service of a greater proportion of men, capable of legislative duties than the country can spare from its professional, mercantile and industrial classes.

7. That the expenditure caused by such separate Governments is tending to crush out the commercial life and energy of the people.