

House of Commons and in the Senate itself, but also on the part of the public. The general impression has been that the Senate as constituted is entirely devoid of power to deal with money Bills, and we have been subjected to being placed upon a parity with other second Chambers in this regard, entirely irrespective of the main question of what are the powers given to the Senate under the British North America Act. As the honourable gentleman from De Salaberry (Hon. Mr. Beique) has very well said—and he elaborated it at considerable length—we are here by reason of a written constitution, and whatever powers we may exercise are derived from that particular source. It is very desirable that the powers of this Chamber should be defined and established so far as it is possible for us to define and establish them, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, conflict or clash with the House of Commons. We are a co-ordinate branch of Parliament, and therefore it is very desirable that there should be a complete understanding, not only on the part of this Chamber but on the part of the House of Commons, as to what our powers are. It is only by having a clear understanding of this nature that good relations will be maintained between the two Chambers; and I regard this report as contributing in that direction in a more valuable way than any other purpose it may serve.

I desire, as a member of this Chamber, that no construction should be placed upon this report by way of a challenge to the House of Commons as to what our powers are. I think it would be very unfortunate if any impression were to go abroad to cause the Commons to be seized of the idea that this Chamber is stretching out its arms for the purpose of exercising what I might term an academic authority on the question of money Bills which might, in a sense, restrict the freedom which the House of Commons exercises in dealing with this class of legislation.

I think, however, that a well-considered report on this particular question is of value by way of reference, so that upon any question arising from time to time we may have before us what I regard as the best-considered view which I have seen presented to this Chamber since I have had the pleasure of being a member thereof. I feel every confidence in saying that at no time during the period for which I have been a member—and I have been in this Chamber since 1890—has this question been so well consid-

Hon. Sir JAMES LOUGHEED.

ered and so well expressed as is revealed by this particular report. Therefore, instead of its being construed as a challenge to the House of Commons, or an assertion that we intend to exercise the right which the constitution might possibly give us, it is there for us as a reference, so that we may be able to exercise that sound discretion and common sense which I think the Senate has always done on questions of this kind, and yet at the same time we may feel that we are acting within the authority of the constitution.

There has always been more or less of a denial by the House of Commons as to the extent to which we might exercise our authority upon money Bills; and yet I am very happy to say that within my recollection there has never been any serious clash between the two Chambers as to the attitude of the Senate upon any particular measure of this character. I hope that, notwithstanding this elaborate report upon the powers exercisable on the question of money Bills, we may not feel that it is necessary on our part to interfere to any greater extent than we have asserted our authority in the past. I think only in this way shall we maintain good relations between the two Chambers. The power vested in the Senate upon money Bills places the Senate of Canada amongst the democratic second chambers of either America or Europe. But it would be unfortunate for the Senate, notwithstanding the powers we possess, derivable from Imperial legislation, if we should come into conflict with the House of Commons representing directly the electorate of this Dominion, even though we feel that we are chargeable with the protection of the rights of the provinces.

There is a tendency on the part of the Senate sometimes to push too much forward the assumption of a sense of responsibility, from the feeling that we are standing here as the guardians of the particular provinces which we represent. The public hesitate to place that responsibility upon our shoulders. They look upon this Chamber as a nominated chamber in no sense responsible to the electorate; and consequently they naturally expect, notwithstanding what the constitution may say, that the popular Chamber will continue to exercise its powers as it has done practically ever since Confederation, and practically determine the vote of Parliament upon money questions. I am not taking that view with the idea of urging that we should derogate in the slightest from the powers that we possess, but only to point out the desirability of always exercising those