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**Mr. MacGuigan:** Arms control and disarmament policy has been and is a priority of the government. It was the subject of intensive hearings in the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence earlier this year. Before preparing its report the committee examined the spectrum of views on security and disarmament. Whereas we are being invited today to support the views of six members of that committee who issued a minority press release, we should in fact be commending the committee for its efforts.

The committee's report, tabled on April 8, contains a number of positive recommendations. The government has been giving serious consideration to the recommendations in the formulation of Canadian positions for the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament.

This important international meeting begins in just over one month. Our preparations have been in progress for over a year. They have included a review of the strategy of suffocation proposed by the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) at the first special session in 1978, the validity of which was reaffirmed in the foreign policy debate last June. Preparations have also included extensive consultations with other countries undertaken by the Ambassador for Disarmament. Today I had the pleasure of welcoming and talking with Dr. Eugene Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the United States, who is in Ottawa for consultations with our government as to the position his government and western governments in general should adopt in the forthcoming months. I might also add that at the request of the former premier of Sweden, who is heading an international study of disarmament, our former ambassador, Mr. Ford, was made available to the study group which, I believe, is in the process of completing its report.

In my statement to the standing committee on February 25 I set out the Canadian objective at UNSSOD II, which is to chart the way ahead and give a further impetus to arms control and disarmament negotiations. It is in fact the period beyond UNSSOD II that is at the centre of our concern and that of our NATO allies. I was pleased that the standing committee also looked ahead in underlining the need to resolve the key decisive issues and to establish conditions which will permit a relaxation of tension, rapid movement toward a new rapprochement and the mutual and balanced reduction of global armaments.

States must press ahead in negotiating verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements not only on existing weapons systems—nuclear, chemical and conventional—but also on weapons systems around the corner. States must not allow arms control and disarmament negotiations to lag too far behind technological developments. The need for further qualitative limitation becomes greater with each passing year. The joint statement of principles negotiated as part of SALT II called for the further qualitative limitation as well as reduction in the number of strategic nuclear weapons. Canada's geographical position means that there is no more important negotiation for Canada than the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R.

talks on strategic arms, which we hope will be resumed at a very early date.

In looking to the future we must also be concerned about the development of weapons systems for use in outer space. Existing international agreements are no longer sufficient. Canada has spoken out on this subject at the United Nations and co-sponsored a resolution at the last general assembly which requested the Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, to consider the question of negotiating effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space. Canada looks to that body to pursue this issue when it resumes in the summer. We will be one of the active participants.

The Committee on Disarmament has in the past few weeks established a working group on a comprehensive test ban to deal with issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a comprehensive test ban. CTB has been and continues to be a Canadian priority precisely because a CTB is a key element in limiting future generations of nuclear weapons. With our expertise Canada can and will play an active role in this new working group.

In negotiating forums like the Committee on Disarmament and the mutual and balanced force reduction talks in Vienna, as well as in deliberative bodies such as UNSSOD II, Canada will take effective positions which will further encourage negotiations.

To recapitulate, our fundamental position is as follows: it is a position of balanced deterrence by radical reduction. This is not something which can be defined exactly. It is a description. It is a principle, and ideal and a goal, but the goal of balanced deterrence is to be achieved not by accretion but by radical reduction of armaments of all kinds. It seems to me that this points to a goal which is not only the right one but also one which is capable of achievement.

By way of specifying that more general principle, I might say that we advocate, first, the radical reduction of present systems and especially the most destabilizing elements in the present systems and, second, we advocate that there should be no substitution of future destabilizing elements for the ones we succeed in eliminating by way of reduction.

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In developing and articulating effective positions, the government will do so on the basis of a balanced security policy which takes into account the need for both nuclear and conventional forces. As I stated in the standing committee, the maintenance of forces sufficient to deter aggression and defend the North Atlantic treaty area is entirely consistent with our commitment to a vigorous arms control and disarmament policy. The two complement and support each other, forming a coherent whole. They serve the same goal of enhancing security and preserving peace. At UNSSOD II we intend to highlight the need for progress in both nuclear and conventional disarmament.

The point is that disarmament cannot be considered as a goal distinct from security. Disarmament can be attained only