

The impact of the current and proposed negotiations, if they succeed, will be to produce a stable balance at a much lower level of armament. It will involve not only important quantitative reductions, but a qualitative change, in that destabilizing systems will have been reduced. We will be dealing not only with a balance at lower levels but with a different kind of balance, in that it will be more stable.

Thus a policy of stabilization has two complementary components: the suffocation strategy which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our current negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

Outer space
weapons

Before I leave the subject of suffocation, I must underscore the urgency of coming to grips with the development of new weaponry for use in outer space. Twenty-five years ago, the first man-made satellite was launched. That event marked a leap in man's mastery of the earth's environment. Fifteen years ago, it did not seem premature to close off the possibility that space might be used for other than peaceful purposes. But today, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is patently inadequate. That is how quickly, in today's world, science fiction becomes reality.

The treaty lays down that nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are not to be placed in orbit, around the earth or stationed in space. In retrospect, that leaves loopholes which risk being highly destabilizing. I am thinking particularly of anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems. I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.

Process of
verification

Of course, the whole edifice rests on key assumptions about verification, and it is to the theory and practice of verification that we must increasingly give attention.

Openness is central to the process of verification. But here, too, technology has taken us well beyond the notions about openness that were prevalent only 25 years ago. When we speak of verification by "national technical means", we have in mind the vast range of activity that is detectable by the magic eye of highly sophisticated satellites plying their intrusive orbits around the globe. I sometimes wonder whether we realize the immensity of the leap we have made; and whether a certain reluctance in accepting the rigours of verification is not an insufferable anachronism.

Verification is not only a matter of access. Verification entails a technology of its own that differs from weapons system to weapons system. Therefore, ideally, the work on verification should prepare the way for arms-control agreements that still lie ahead; otherwise, problems of verification will inevitably prevent the conclusion of even well advanced arms-control negotiations. In this context I am encouraged by the
