

the United States, export-all would be most effective in minimizing safety and environmental threats both to Russia and to sustained disposition.

Approaches to reactor-based disposition that are friendly towards closed fuel-cycle development in Russia cannot however be reconciled with irreversibility without reducing the latter to a physical procedure aimed at making WGPu conform to the spent-fuel standard. If we're determined to safeguard the collective capacity to commit excess WGPu to reactor-based disposition, there is no choice but to avoid procedures which pose safety and environmental dangers to Russians, to their surround, and to the programme of disposition itself.

Agency for nuclear safety and environmental protection is lacking in Russia.

Donors will therefore need to work with the Russian Federation to create new agency if disposition is to be sustained.

Of the alternatives that might be considered, this study finds in favour of a nonprofit corporation which would be handed over to the Russian Federation once agreed milestones had been passed. Subject to the guidance of an intergovernmental council, the corporation would have a number of novel features corresponding to the novel situation in which it would have to work. It would strive to create nuclear-safety, environmental, and social conditions conducive to its own success. It would carry a proactive conditionality forward on behalf of sustained disposition.

Finally, this study finds it necessary to take Russian public opinion into account now if a Multilateral Agreement on disposition is to get off the ground. Specifically, disposition must be separated from the issue of nuclear-waste imports. The circumstances in which the Russian people might in effect acquire and exercise a veto over a Multilateral Agreement, or over the continuation of disposition following an accident, cannot of course be predicted. But the potentiality is there, as is the political and ethical responsibility of donors to defer under certain conditions. Such a responsibility should be publicly acknowledged.

### *Strategy for Sustained Disposition*

Strategies for disposition have not been the subject of international debate. Contrasting views are still to be found on reactor-based and immobilization routes to disposition. But little or no systematic attention has been given to what it takes to succeed in providing international support for disposition in Russia over a period of many years.

A proactive approach to disposition which originates in our trio of conditionalities does help us start grappling with the long view in a substantial part of its complexity. A focus on conditionality generates two strategic priorities and a unifying perspective. By no means do considerations such as these add up to a strategy. But they do impart structure to the situation in ways that open new possibilities to control outcomes.

The first of the priorities is to secure disposition against contravention. Hedging by both principals and closed fuel-cycle development in Russia offer powerful challenges to irreversibility. Future Russian reliance on civil plutonium poses the larger threat. It requires the