

Category-three states with limited capabilities in both conventional forces and WMDs are in one sense the best targets for RMA technologies as they are the most vulnerable. In addition, as they are generally weaker militarily, their political influence is likely to be correspondingly less. In another sense, with a more rudimentary conventional force, one that depended less on fixed infrastructure and concentrated forces, and in a situation where governmental institutions and communications links were already weak, RMA technologies may find few suitable targets. If these states were also prepared to accept high civilian casualties and engage in a protracted guerilla war, technological superiority may not yield a quick military victory and political settlement. A target state in this position may also make use of the new era of "globalization" Portraying itself as a helpless victim of aggression by the powerful they "have an unprecedented opportunity to manipulate the burgeoning global media to their advantage, whether by courting world opinion or undermining an adversary's domestic base of support.."<sup>112</sup>

The category three state may have limited WMD capabilities without the kind of supporting facilities that could be easily attacked by conventional forces and thus may survive an RMA attack. The willingness of the target state to engage the United States at high cost, could lower the threshold at which a limited number of WMDs were employed, especially against forwardly deployed American forces and bases. But if such a state were already able to raise the cost of intervention through conventional means, and in so doing keep the leadership in power, it is difficult to see the use of even limited WMD given the expected response.

In this case, as in the one above, external persuasion to accept limits on armaments may be possible. This will depend though on the extent to which the international community can provide security assurances, particularly if they face neighboring states which have acquired greater conventional or WMD capabilities. Ironically, one way of providing such assurances may be the RMA which in these instances would assume something of a post-Cold War mechanism for extended deterrence in the service of non-proliferation. At the same time category three state which had more rudimentary and limited WMD capabilities and whose political leadership wished to retain them as means of deterring an attack might be less receptive to becoming a party to international arms control regimes.

The United States is taking such scenarios seriously as indicated by the emphasis it is putting on both deterring and coping with WMD attacks on its forces and even the American homeland. The National Missile Defense (NMD) is justified on the grounds that it will allow the United States more freedom of action in terms of dealing with "rogue" states and providing protection if their leaders irrationally cross that threshold and use their "limited" WMD capabilities. The deterrent dimension of this approach should not be underestimated. After all, "limited" is a relative term. A rudimentary chemical attack on American forces which resulted in scores of deaths, would be considered a national disaster for a country where the avoidance of casualties has become almost military doctrine.

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<sup>112</sup> Libicki, "Rethinking War" pp. 30-31.