

A fifth area of concern mentioned in both the 1991 and 1999 NATO strategic concepts and in much associated literature is the issue of spillover from conflict or state collapse in Central and Eastern Europe. The principal form that spillover has taken over the past decade is forced migration (viz. the massive flow of former Yugoslav citizens to Germany in 1991-3 or the flood of Albanians to Italy in 1997). As is evident in the link between migration flows and the growth of the extreme right in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, such flows can have deeply disturbing effects on recipient states.

Several qualifications are important here. First, the dangers of spillover are related to the incidence of conflict. The incidence of new conflict in the OSCE space has declined since the early 1990s. Although, as noted above, there is substantial potential for new conflict, this potential is present for the most part in regions far removed from Western and Central Europe. Conflict-related migration flows are likely to affect principally the newly independent states, as well as (possibly) non-OSCE member states along the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union (as occurred in both Iran and Afghanistan in the early 1990s).

Second, the experience of Germany in radically curtailing the flow of asylum-seekers in 1993-4 suggests that states have effective means of managing this problem. The evolution of the Schengen regime indicates further that Western European states are developing multilateral mechanisms to manage the process more effectively. The extension of Schengen arrangements as part of the EU accession process will push these mechanisms farther east. More generally, the international "community" is, willy-nilly and rightly or wrongly, revising the international refugee regime in order to prevent people from fleeing conflict, notably through increased efforts to deal with migrant populations inside their own country or in contiguous states.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the effects of specific episodes of mass migration are often concentrated in single states rather than constituting a regional problem, as was evident in the case of Albanians crossing the Adriatic. Not surprisingly, this asymmetry of interest complicates multilateral response. This explains the lack of a NATO response to the Albanian crisis and the decision of the Italians to lead a "coalition of the willing" instead.<sup>28</sup>

The problem of refugees from conflict is only one aspect of the issue of migration. The second is economic migration. Here, it is noteworthy that the dimensions of the problem of south-north and east-west economic migration have turned out to be smaller than most anticipated in the early years of the decade, while state and regional capacities (e.g. Schengen) have turned out to be more robust than initially anticipated in dealing with this problem.

Another major aspect of spillover is the spread of political violence from its point of origin

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<sup>27</sup> Adam Roberts, "More Refugees, Less Asylum: A Regime in Transformation," *Journal of Refugee Studies* XI (1998), No. 4, pp.375-395.

<sup>28</sup> Ettore Greco, *Delegating Peace Operations: Improvisation and Innovation in Georgia and Albania* (New York: UN Association of the United States, 1998), pp.19-21.