

implementation. Parties entering into arms control agreements might, therefore, be encouraged to communicate relevant texts and to make further reports on the matter available to the United Nations. In accumulating this information, the United Nations could start to serve as a "database" or "verification information point" (VIP) to provide data and advice at the request of member states.

Verification operations by their nature must also be treaty-specific activities. Designing, negotiating and agreeing upon appropriate verification provisions for a specific agreement are intimately related to the particular arms control measures to be undertaken pursuant to that treaty. In addition, verification requires considerable specialized expertise and technology that will vary depending on the arms control measures in question.

A verification agency, which would seek to cover in one organization a number of arms control agreements, introduces serious complexities because each arms control agreement has a different set of parties that have signed and ratified it. Numerous difficulties can be envisaged, in terms of decision-making, operations and control of information, with regard to a verification agency whose duties covered a number of different agreements. At the same time, these difficulties could well make the agency unworkable.

It is also essential to have clear plans concerning the operational missions that a possible single verification organization would have to undertake. It is difficult to identify such missions if the arms control measures to be verified do not yet exist: at present, there are few multilateral agreements that would warrant the creation of an extensive United Nations verification organization for operational monitoring purposes. It would therefore be preferable to install separate arrangements for individual arms control agreements. The CW convention and the organization foreseen in the draft treaty is an example. These separate arrangements would be more effective and probably less costly than an international verification organization to cover all treaties.

Another consideration is that, at present, the United Nations has limited involvement and expertise with respect to operational aspects of verification. It is costly and time consuming to develop such expertise on a large scale. Efforts to acquire an operational verification capability should only