ber, 1868, and expired after twenty-six weekly numbers had been published. Bishop Bourget, the support and hope of the Jesuits, was then in the ascendent of his power. Alone among the journals of the Province of Quebec, La Lanterne made open war upon the theocracy which aimed at nothing less than the suppression of civil liberty. If M. Buies dealt heavy blows at his adversaries, his face always wore a smile, sometimes of mockery, for satire as well as wit flowed readily from his pen. His printer, threatened with the loss of more valuable patronage, if he continued to print the obnoxious journal, decided that the bigger loaf was the better. The little urchins who sold the paper were threatened and intimidated; news-vendors were influenced to cease selling it; the friends who aided M. Buies got frightened, and at last he was brought to feel like a man alone in a desert. The conditions of existence for La Lanterne had passed away, and the pamphletjournal soon followed. Since that time fifteen years have rolled over, and La Lanterne re-appears in book-form. M. Buies marks the significance of the fact by saying: "Le règne de la théocratie est fini, à tout jamais anénti." He adds that during these years the reaction against the Jesuits and their supporters has proceeded with marvellous rapidity. "There are," he says, "undoubtedly enlightened and educated priests who comprehend their epoch, and who look with fear to the future which the excesses and monstrocities of this party are preparing for the church; but their number is too small to enable them to arrest the torrent of blind and imbecile fanaticism." Still, he feels that no progress for French Canada is possible "till it be entirely freed from clerical control and clerical government." His hope is in the young men, whom the Jesuits can no longer hold in leading strings; and he thinks the change may be made without shock, and without the violence that too often accompanies revolution. But it remains true that the great mass of the clergy has not abated its pretentions one jot. The Archbishop, in opposing the restoration of the Jesuits' estates and in other ways has shown that he is not ignorant of the spirit of the times in which he lives, and that he is determined to keep in check the wild and desperate schemes of the Jesuits.

THE Nicaraguan Treaty may meet opposition in the House of Representatives at Washington on some side issues. The House may want to know who are the speculators behind the scenes: who are to benefit by the appropriation which it will be necessary to ask should ratification be accorded. A Washington correspondent says: "There are members of the Appropriations Committee who will not without question accept the assurance that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is an obsolete instrument;" but whether they are likely to be in a majority is a point on which he offers no opinion. The old-fashioned way of terminating a treaty which had no fixed or contingent time for its cessation was by the mutual consent of the contracting parties. Any new treaty made in violation of an old one used to be accounted null and void. The violation of a treaty by one of the contracting parties authorized the other contracting party to terminate it; but text writers have laid it down that a treaty which is injurious to one of the contracting parties cannot be assumed to have been intended to be perpetual. It was open to the United States to plead any alteration of the circumstances in which the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty originated as a reason why England ought to consent to its abrogation. In the construction of the Suez Canal, which 'gives England a short cut to her Eastern possessions, an essential alteration of the circumstances in which this treaty originated might have been found, if that event had placed the United States at a relative disadvantage in communicating between New York and San Francisco. And this would have happened if no transcontinental railway had been built. This might have furnished a good reason why the United States should ask to be released from the obligations of the treaty. But if neither of the contracting parties could alone build or maintain a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, might the two not agree to do together what each had prohibited itself from doing alone? No more obvious question could have been asked under the circumstances. To a right of way across the American isthmus all commercial nations may be said to have a fair claim. Under what conditions that right shall be exercised is the only question about which there is room to dispute. It would not be unreasonable that a common highway should afford some guarantee that it would be managed for the general benefit of the nations whose commerce passed over it. There is nothing in the usages of nations or the principles of international law that would justify any one nation assuming exclusive control of a right of way through an independent foreign nation. There are two grounds on which such claim of exclusive control might be made: the propinquity of a predominating power, or a preponderating interest as represented by the most extensive commerce passing over this right of way. One of these claims the United States can make, England the other. But the independence of the sovereignty over whose territory the right of way is given would be best preserved by the

combined guarantee of the nations chiefly interested; and the last use that should be made of a right of way is to menace the independence of the nation whose territory is passed over, and whose rights should be held sacred. That the world's commerce would be greatly benefited by a canal across the American isthmus no one denies; the question is, what are the possible guarantees under which that commerce can best be assured of fair and equitable treatment.

In the United States a strong tide of opposition has set in against the Spanish Treaty. The New York Chamber of Commerce considers it hostile to the interests of the country and objects to its confirmation. The treaty if confirmed would, it is estimated, cause an annual loss of revenue from the free admission of sugar of twenty-eight millions of dollars, and the objectors to the treaty believe that the nation would receive no adequate compensation for the sacrifice. They argue that the sugar on which duty would continue to be paid would regulate the price in the United States markets, and that the practical result would be to make Spain a present of an annual sum nearly equal to the amount of the duty remitted. The competition for the sugar on which no duty had to be paid would probably raise its price to nearly the level of the total cost of the dutiable sugars Cuba and Porto Rico would gain by the increase in price. question, which the Chamber of Commerce did not touch, is whether this loss would be compensated by the profits on the greater quantities of American goods which would be purchased by Cuba and Porto Rico, and for which an increased price would be paid. Until this question is answered and the full scope of the treaty is brought under review, no adequate judgment can be formed of its probable effect. Certainly the experience of the Hawaiian Treaty is not encouraging. The loss of revenue under that treaty has been over fifteen millions and a-half (\$15,630,000) in seven years, during which time the American exports to the islands have been only a little more than seventeen millions (\$17,130,551). The increase in the exports was only nine per cent. over the general rate of increase, and political arithmeticians argue that for every ten cents of gain to American commerce the nation has sacrificed ninety cents in revenue. The United States trade with Cuba is at present represented by about five dollars' worth of imports to every dollar's worth of exports. Under the treaty the imports would largely increase, and the exports could not remain stationary. When a series of treaties is proposed, in which the intention is to embrace if possible the whole of Central and South America, it is difficult for Congress to deal with them in detail, so different may be the result of one treaty from that of a number of treaties. It would make a great deal of difference between admitting into the United States free of duty thirty per cent. of the sugar consumed and admitting the whole on these terms. A remission of the duty on the sugar produced by one country would enable that country to raise the price of its sugar to almost the level of the market price as fixed chiefly by the duty-paying sugar; but if all the sugar imported were free, the partial check on competition would be removed, and the market would be supplied on the lowest possible terms The ratification of a single treaty, when it is uncertain what others are to follow, would be a leap in the dark which Congress will probably not be in haste to take.

Mr. Thomas Hughes whose English Letter we have the pleasure of presenting to our readers in this number has just been receiving a wellearned tribute of gratitude as the leader of the co-operative movement, a scholarship at Oxford for commercial studies having been founded in his honour. His speech on the occasion has re-opened the debate on Cooperation, and on the efforts of the Christian Socialists to substitute co-operation for competition. Distributive co-operation, or the system of co-operative stores, has been an immense success, not only economically but morally, inasmuch as by introducing ready-money payments it has begotten thrift and set the workingman free from the slavery of debt. Protective co-operation, or the system of co-operative works, has been comparatively a failure, and the lesson taught by the experiment appears to be that we shall neither be able to do without competition nor to dispense with the resources and the guidance of the large capitalist. But Mr. Thomas Hughes is the captain of a band of men who have a claim to gratitude irrespectively of any particular doctrine or experiment. He and his associates, men drawn from the upper class, but full of sympathy with the working-class, have stood at a critical juncture of social history between the conflicting interests, and by acting as mediators and arbitrators averted industrial war. It is largely owing to their efforts that England has been saved from the fierce and destructive collisions which have taken place in France and other countries. They have succeeded in giving to English industry peace, with justice. A higher service could hardly have been rendered to a community.