until driven to do so. That a commercial partnership with the States, with a high tariff against the rest of the world, will ultimately lead to a political partnership, is a conviction we cannot dissuade ourselves of by any argument; it is reported to be the conviction of Mr. Chamberlain also; and in view of that important fact—important from his known business capacity and insight, and from the bearing of his opinion on the settlement of the Fisheries question—it is now for those who have all along been contending for the reverse, to give us the data and reasons on which they base their opinions. They are lost otherwise, with Mr. Chamberlain apparently and Sir Charles Tupper undoubtedly against them.

The brief filed at Sitka by the United States Government in answer to the British demurrer to the seizures in Behring's Sea, claims that sea as a *mare clausum* over which the United States has supremacy, jurisdiction, and dominion, as over any other of its inland waters, gulfs, bays, and seas. Vattel is cited in support, who says: "If a sea is entirely enclosed by the territories of a nation and has no other communication with the ocean than by a channel of which that nation may take possession, it appears that such a sea is no less capable of being occupied and becoming property than the land, and it ought to follow the fate of the country that surrounds it. The Mediterranean in former times was absolutely enclosed within the territories of the Romans; and that people, by rendering themselves masters of the strait which joins it to the ocean, might subject the Mediterranean to their empire and assume dominion over it. They did not by such proceeding injure the rights of other nations, a particular sea being manifestly designed by nature for the use of the countries and nations that surround it." But to this it may be objected that Behring's Sea is not landlocked to anything like the same extent as the Mediterranean; it is divided from the North Pacific by a chain of scattered islands which, separated from each other by stretches of sea in some cases many miles wide, extend little more than half across from the American to the Asian coast, leaving an open space of nearly five hundred miles unbroken by any land whatever. Moreover, the western shore of this sea does not belong to the United States but to Russia. Of what force or applicability then is the declaration of Mr. Sumner, in the Senate in 1852, cited in the brief, that "our [the United States'] right to jurisdiction over these, the larger and more important arms of the sea on both our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, rests upon the rule of international law which gives a nation jurisdiction over waters embraced within its land dominion?" Manning's *Law of Nations* and Wharton's *International Law* are both also quoted to show that rivers and inland lakes and seas when contained in a particular State are subject to the sovereign of such State,—which rule manifestly does not apply to Behring's Sea, that being an international sea, washing the shores of two States. However, whatever validity these arguments may or may not have in the Behring's Sea case, by their assertion in this formal manner the United States Government virtually concedes, though it denies in form, the soundness of the British contention that Americans are excluded by international law from fishing on the Canadian coast within a line drawn a marine league or three miles seaward from headland to headland of all bays and inlets. Not otherwise can it maintain its right of dominion, also asserted in evidence in the brief, over such vast inland waters as the great lakes, Boston Harbour, Long Island Sound, Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, Albemarle Sound and the Bay of San Francisco. According to the brief, Secretary Pickering in 1796 affirmed the principle that "our [the United States'] jurisdiction has been fixed to extend three geographical miles from our shores, with the exception of any waters or bays which are so landlocked as to be unquestionably within the jurisdiction of the States, be their extent what they may [which last sentence would include the Behring's Sea, if it could be considered landlocked];" and Secretary Buchanan in 1849 reiterates this rule in the following language:—"The exclusive jurisdiction of a nation extends to the ports, harbours, bays, mouths of rivers, and adjacent parts of the sea enclosed by headlands"—a rule which applies equally well to Canadian jurisdiction over the Gulf of the St. Lawrence and the smaller bays and inlets of the Canadian coast as to American jurisdiction over Boston Harbour or Chesapeake Bay, to say nothing of Behring's Sea.

It is asserted nevertheless in this brief, in spite of the array of authorities to the contrary in other parts of the document, and of the supreme example of the Behring's Sea case, that the three-mile limit *follows all the indentations and sinuosities of the coast.* This, the brief states, must be accepted as a settled law of nations. And here we get the clue to this maze of American diplomacy—Behring's Sea and all the harbours and bays on the American coast—in reference to some of which their own courts have declared that the headland doctrine, as maintained by Great Britain, is the law of nations,—are to be deemed "inland waters" over which there can be no question of jurisdiction; while the harbours and bays of the Canadian coast—including the Gulf of the St. Lawrence, which is certainly much more landlocked than Behring's Sea, at any rate,—are to be treated as arms of the sea over which Canada has no jurisdiction beyond a three-mile limit, following all the indentations and sinuosities of the coast. The main drift of the brief, in fact, is to make out Behring's Sea to be an "inland sea" over which the United States exercises, by the law of nations, unquestionable jurisdiction—a contention attempted to be supported by the bare assertion that the Treaties of 1824–5 with the United States and England—by which Russia relinquished her claim to sovereignty over the North Pacific (north of a line drawn from 51° on the American coast to 45° 50′ on the Asian)—did not refer to Behring's Sea at all! But this pretension of exclusive jurisdiction is preposterous: how can a sea whose shores are owned in part by Russia, and which is moreover a possible highway to the Arctic Ocean, on whose shores abut the possessions of other Powers, be considered as of the nature of "inland waters" belonging exclusively to the United States?

It is argued that because in the Treaties of 1824–5 it was stipulated that ships, citizens, and subjects of either Power might reciprocally frequent the *interior seas*, gulfs, harbours, and creeks of the other on the North American coast for a period of ten years, therefore, as the only *interior sea* on the North American Coast is Behring's Sea, that section of the Treaty really concedes Russia's dominion over Behring's Sea. But this is surely a feeble support to such a monstrous claim. The simple fact appears to be that Russia never pretended to jurisdiction over the whole of Behring's Sea, but only over a distance of one hundred Italian miles from the shores and the coasts of the islands. This claim was resisted by both the United States and Great Britain, and Russia gave way, making treaties with both Powers, conceding their position, and never afterwards reviving her pretensions. These, however, the United States, having meanwhile acquired Alaska, now revive and extend in order to make out that Behring's Sea,—which was unquestionably meant by the designation "Pacific Ocean" in the treaty, for Russia has never claimed jurisdiction south of the limits of that sea, and which was therefore the main subject of the treaty,—was outside the scope of that treaty, being an "inland sea' then under the sole undisputed jurisdiction of Russia, and now under that of the United States!

Much and constant literary work seems to breed a disinclination to answer letters—especially business letters. If correspondents knew how hard a task it is for a busy literary man to turn to the despatch of correspondence they would never be so cruel as to expect answers to their letters. They would leave him in peace to follow the simple plan of John Ruskin (which most of them do, at any rate), who, in a recently published letter, says: "And now my room is ankle deep in unanswered letters, mostly on business, and I'm going to shovel them up and tie them in a parcel labelled 'Needing particular attention,' and then that will be put into a cupboard in Oxford, and I shall feel that everything's been done in a business-like way."

In reference to recent articles in The Week on Canada in Fiction, a correspondent reminds us of several works of Canadian writers that we have omitted to mention. There is Miss Machar's *For King and Country*, a story of the War of 1812-14, which won the prize given by the *Canadian Monthly* in a competition for the best Canadian tale sent it. Miss Machar also wrote a serial, *Lost and Won*, for the same magazine. And Miss Louisa Murray wrote *Fauna, or the Red Flowers of Leafy Hollow*, a romance which was published as a serial in the Montreal *Literary Garland*, and which attracted a good deal of attention, having been reprinted in several Canadian and American, and one Irish newspaper. *The Settlers of Long Arrow* was another of Miss Murray's Canadian tales, published in the London (Eng.) *Once a Week*, and illustrated by that gifted young artist, Frederick Walker, who died young, but not before his pictures had made him famous.

Modern Radicals who are defying the Government in Ireland have forgotten what was said by their exemplar, Tom Paine, in his *Rights of Man*:—"If a law be bad it is one thing to oppose and resist its execution, but very different to expose its errors, reason on its defects, and endeavour to procure its repeal. It is better to obey a bad law, reasoning at the same time against it, than forcibly to violate it, because breaking a bad law might lead to discretionary violations of those which are good."