

"GRANT AND JULIUS CÆSAR."

THE comparative standard by which military heroes are judged will always differ as widely as the standards and prejudices of the judges themselves. Thus we see the Hon. Mr. Belford, of Colorado, comparing General Grant with one of the greatest soldiers of antiquity; while Col. Denison is of opinion that he was a pure creature of accident, who simply "happened to be in command when Lee was defeated." The writer served under Grant during the great struggle, and his experience led to very different conclusions; so much so, that he ventures to think Mr. Denison must have formed his opinions upon misrepresentations of the real facts.

In attempting to do justice to a soldier who has had unintentional injustice done to him, we will commence at a point which found Grant a division commander under Halleck. We may say that his successes in the West covered so wide a range of conquest as to forbid more than the briefest synopsis. This occupied two seasons (1862-3), and included three campaigns, fifteen great battles (exclusive of the three general assaults on Vicksburg), among which were some of the bloodiest of modern times, besides many of lesser importance. Col. Denison tacitly concedes that Grant never lost a battle in the West, but he forgets to say that McClellan did *not* either form or train the armies which followed him to victory there. He also forgets to tell us that at Fort Donaldson, a stronghold considered impregnable, stored, armed and garrisoned to stand any siege from any force, the number who surrendered to Grant after three days' desperate fighting, almost equalled his own entire command, and was the greatest, at that day, who had ever laid down their arms at one time on the continent of America. He omits all mention of the terrible action at Pittsburg Landing, so full of fate to the American people, where Grant, coming upon what already seemed a lost battle, "with odds against him * * * inspired his men with confidence * * * and wrested victory from despair." He deems it unnecessary to mention that both great battles at Corinth were fought against overwhelming forces, and that, after both battles, the dead and severely-wounded Confederates left on the field more than doubled the Federal casualties by actual count. He is good enough to admit that Grant "did some good service around Vicksburg." People generally have the same idea, somewhat magnified, however, in face of the following officially epitomized report of the result of the operations: "The defeat of the enemy in five battles outside of Vicksburg, the occupation of Jackson, the capital of the State of Mississippi; the capture of Vicksburg with its garrison and munitions of war, and the opening of the Mississippi from its head waters to the Gulf of Mexico; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, over 10,000 killed and wounded, and thousands scattered, who can never be collected and reorganized; arms and munitions for an army of 60,000 men, besides an enormous amount of other public property, and much more which was destroyed by the enemy to prevent its capture." Grant's losses in accomplishing this result were 8,575 men, viz: 943 killed, 7,095 wounded, and 537 "missing," which means either killed or captured.

The campaign of the Cumberland included the battles of Perryville, Stone River, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga, otherwise variously known as Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, besides the siege of Knoxville and a great many smaller battles and skirmishes. Of the whole series Chickamauga was the only one wherein the North suffered a serious reverse. Of 50,000 men that Rosecrans took into this action he lost over 25,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, beside 51 cannon. Bragg, who opposed him with about the same number of troops, which were reinforced during the progress of the battle, by Longstreet's corps, reported a loss of over 20,000 in killed and wounded, and was so crippled he could not pursue. But receiving further reinforcements from Virginia, he closely besieged the Federals in Chattanooga. Grant at once relieved Rosecrans, and coming from Vicksburg, took personal command. Jefferson Davis, who made a special trip from Richmond, considered Grant's doom so surely sealed that he detached Longstreet to wrest Knoxville from Burnside. But Sherman was approaching by forced marches from Vicksburg, "with only two days' rations, without trains, living on the enemy's country, without a change of clothing, and with but a single blanket or great coat to a man, though it was the end of November, from myself to the private inclusive," as he himself says. The rapidity of his march utterly astounded the Confederates. Throwing himself into Chattanooga, Grant took advantage of Longstreet's absence and immediately attacked Bragg in his fortifications. How he out-generalled, out-fought, and utterly routed his enemy in the "Battle above the Clouds" is too well known to call for comment. Among the fruits of this victory, which ended Grant's operations in the West, were 40 cannon, over 6,000 prisoners, and the raising of the siege of Knoxville by the rapid retreat of Longstreet into Virginia. Thus, opposed by brave and determined enemies, led by the ablest generals of the South, often in face of greatly

superior forces, operating in regions whose topography made them easy of defence, and continually surrounded by an active and bitterly hostile population, the "man of chance" had, besides immense captures of stores, prisoners and public property, and with a loss of killed and wounded much lighter than his enemy's, conquered for his cause an empire, as it were, vast in area, fertility and riches; and now held in practical submission, if not yet in full allegiance, the entire territory west of the Alleghanies.

Coming to the year '64, when placed in supreme military command, what do we find? The great political uncertainties, both at home and abroad, made the outlook far more desperate than the military situation would suggest. The duplicity of Louis Napoleon in seeking to induce combined European action in favor of the South, his invasion of the neighbouring republic of Mexico, and establishing an empire on its ruins, the hostility of the "ruling classes" in England, who were striving to incite the British Government to acts of hostility, the machinations of the "copperheads" in sympathy with the slave-holders, and the draft riots and negro butcheries by the Irish thieves, thugs and "greek-fire" vagabonds of New York and other large cities of the North, all combined to make it compulsory that Grant should adopt the "hammering" process, it being now a political rather than a military necessity, in order to prevent foreign intervention, to accomplish certain results within a certain time no matter at what cost. The "fact" is *not* "undoubted," but absolutely untrue, that he refused to exchange prisoners. It was purely a political question with which he had nothing whatever to do. It was decided by the treaty-making power of the national government, and exchange was refused because rebels would thereby be acknowledged as belligerents, and this would have involved foreign political complications. The imaginary cruelty which his critic condemns in Grant is applauded in Frederick the Great, whose record was one uninterrupted series of brutal butcheries and massacres, unparalleled cruelty and treachery, broken treaties and perfidious desertion of friends. Kind-hearted to his soldiers, Grant looked upon the cruelties of war as the necessary price of his country's future tranquillity, a fact clearly demonstrated by the generous conditions offered Lee when completely in his power, and by the resulting circumstances which gave birth to the historic epigram, "Let us have Peace." His magnanimity to his enemies is further proven by the chivalrous manner in which he treated his prisoners at Fort Donaldson and Vicksburg, after receiving their "unconditional surrender," while his loyalty to his comrades is aptly illustrated by his conduct toward Sherman, when the latter entered a formal written protest against his "breaking loose" from his base before Vicksburg, by handing him back the protest (instead of forwarding it to the War Department) after the movement had proved a complete success.

Grant's admirable report, the accuracy of which has never been questioned even by his enemies, and the same from which his critic quotes in reference to the "hammering" process, the following: "The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours, but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory with a population hostile to the Government, and long lines of communication to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies, and it is a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages." His army, as Col. Denison informs us, was composed in large part of substitutes and conscripts, which would seem rather an impediment, and contrasts strangely with his subsequent statement that it "had been formed and trained by McLellan in the early part of the war." Instead of Lee having 50,000 men in his "Army of Northern Virginia," as alleged, he had over 65,000 "present for duty" on the Rapidan, according to his own reports subsequently captured at Richmond, besides "interior lines," which gave him immense advantages of concentrating and choosing positions. Instead of Grant's losing 100,000 men to Lee's 18,000 between the Rapidan and the Chickahominy, the actual losses were: Grant, 65,551 killed and wounded, 9,856 "missing," and 5,000 prisoners, total 80,405; Lee, 52,000 killed, wounded and "missing," and 8,500 prisoners, total 60,500. Both generals had from time to time been largely reinforced. Grant's objective point was Richmond, Lee's object to keep him as far as possible from Richmond. If Grant was four times severely defeated, as his critic says, how did he get there? Probably by being so stupid as not to know it, and so kept "hammering" away. The same story is told of Scott in Mexico and Wellington at Waterloo. According to all rules of military etiquette Wellington was beaten at Quatre Bras, but he "hammered" away and "happened to be there" after Napoleon found it convenient to leave. It was Santa Anna who accused Scott of being a like fool. Lee, however, "one fit to rank with the greatest generals of all ages," has not left this record of his great enemy.

Of a part with other criticisms are, (1) that had Grant commanded in 1862 on the Chickahominy, instead of McClellan the army would have