

untested weapons, which even their advocates say must be carefully inspected after only 250 quiet and cool discharges, at the rate of eight rounds every three months, and which it is boasted do not burst during a sea voyage in time of peace, though they are considerably injured by the act of training the crews. Arm the British fleet with such doubtful rifled weapons, and it is quite possible that in a well contested naval action it may be come wholly disarmed by the irregular wobbling and hammering of its own viciously rifled projectiles. The defeat of the British fleet must come from within, and could be arranged for by discouraging the officers and men; by keeping from them all experience of naval weapons of destruction in use in other fleets; and by supplying to them guns which have never been tested for rapid continuous fire, and are known to be rifled contrary to all mechanical principles. When we have thus organized the fleet for defeat, and attained that end, then, and not till then, shall our second line of defence be required to repel invaders."

THE rapid and signal success of the Prussian arms during the late contest with France, has very justly invested, with profound interest, every means, probable or otherwise, by which it was or might be attained.

As the tactical subject has been exhausted, and strategy pretty nearly so, the educational element is now submitted to analytical discussion, and the tendency appears to be in the direction of attributing undue weight to the peculiar training of the Prussian subaltern, and as a primary element therein—the practical lessons of strategy taught by a game of military chess, for it is nothing more, called the *Krieg-Spiel* or game of war.

Many of our contemporaries suppose this to be one of those new inventions which Prussian military genius has given to the world, and they will, no doubt, be surprised to learn that it was at least 25 years older than the battle of Jena in which the Prussian army was annihilated by the French, altho' the latter had not studied strategy on a chess board while the former had.

The *United Service Journal* for 1851, at page 75, part 1, has a well written notice of "The War Game of Prussia," in which it is described as "the familiar mode of illustrating the evolutions of troops by small rectangular figures."

It appears to have been invented in 1780 by a Professor HELLWIG of Brunswick, and improved as well as adopted by the Prussian War Department in 1821, and known by its modern name—it was played by two persons with a third for umpire—with plans and every appliance similar to those now in use.

Our object in noticing this, is to introduce a lecture delivered at Dover on 13th March last, by H. R. II. PRINCE ARTHUR, on this subject, and as every movement of the distinguished lecturer is of interest to the members of the Canadian army we give that portion of the lecture as it appeared in the *Broad Arrow*.

At the same time we are not inclined to pin our faith on that knowledge which would

be acquired by a game of chess, we believe it to be a fact that some of the best strategists and most successful commanders were totally ignorant of that noble game.

It may be valuable to young officers to be taught what strategy means by a mechanical process, but no one except Mr. CARDWELL would think of training Generals by illustrations of the art of war.

"It is significant of the modern advance in popular education in the army to find so many officers and even soldiers occasionally coming forward as expositors of military science. The lecture delivered by H. R. II. Prince Arthur on Wednesday at the Garrison Instructor's Class-room, Dover, on the 'Game of War,' consisted of a remarkably lucid description of the German '*Krieg Spiel*,' and was designed to excite an interest in the subject among His Royal Highness's brother officers in the garrison and district. Among the officers and gentlemen present were Sir Howard Elphinstone, K. C. B., Lieutenant Fitzgerald, Colonel W. Parke, C. B., commanding at Shorncliffe; Colonel McDonald, assistant adjutant-general; Colonel Mayne, assistant quarter master general; Mr. A. W. Downes, district controller; General Dalzell; Major Blenkinsopp, superintendent of the riding establishment in Canterbury; Major Crooks, Mr. T. Humphreys, &c.

"Colonel McDonald, as president of the Dover Association for the discussion of military subjects, introduced the royal lecturer. He said he hoped he might be permitted to observe that the honor His Royal Highness had conferred upon them by being present on that occasion, and by his introduction of a subject known only by name to most in that assemblage, would give a stimulus to the institution it had never hitherto possessed.

"Having already described the *modus operandi* of the game, we now confine ourselves to that portion of the royal lecture which represents the Prince's own original views of the application of the '*Krieg-Spiel*.' His Royal Highness made the following historical reference to the '*Krieg Spiel*.' Some twenty years ago a society of officers was formed at Magdeburg for the special object of playing the game. The chief of this society was Von Moltke, who attached great importance to it. To attempt a full explanation of the rules would occupy far too long a time, and would, he feared, be wearisome. Prince Arthur proceeded to explain the general principles and *modus operandi* of the game. During the late war most of them, he supposed, followed the movements of the armies by placing pins on maps to represent the different bodies of troops, and thus got an excellent idea how matters stood each day. The game of war was simply an amplification of this; instead of pins, leaden blocks were used, and these blocks were cut to scale so as to suit the maps and show the exact disposition and space occupied by each arm of the Service as well as the direction in which they were moving. The Prince produced one of the maps used in Prussia, on a scale of eight inches to the mile; the Austrian maps were upon the same scale, but English ordnance maps were on a scale of only six inches to the mile. In order, however, to make use of these maps, the War Office were now engaged in getting leaden models of troops, of a size suitable to this scale. He understood, also, that it was intended to issue shortly a set of maps and models to each military district. His Royal Highness pointed out a remarkable peculiarity in the Aus-

trian map, the pieces composing it being turned in any direction one pleased, yet always fitting, and thus enabling the players, while using the same map, to change the feature of the ground. In explaining the principles of the game, the Prince said that two persons were chosen to take charge of the opposing forces, a third acting as umpire. The two players or opponents need not be very learned. All that was required of them was that they should know what the different blocks were, be able to read a map, and have all the knowledge of the principles which governed the marches of troops, their disposition in action, &c., and, lastly, that they should yield implicit obedience to the decision of the umpire. The umpire, on the other hand should thoroughly understand the theory and practice of the art of war, and know perfectly all the rules of the game, so that he could apply them at once to any case that might occur. Before commencing the play, the umpire issues a 'general idea' stating the nature of the operations and the general object which each side is endeavoring to obtain. This should be done a day or two before the game began in order to give officers sufficient time to study the map. As an illustration of this 'general idea' His Royal Highness supposed an invading army had landed and established itself at Hythe, and while pushing rapidly on towards London, detached a corps towards Dover and Chatham to mask them; the troops in the South-eastern District concentrating in Dover for a combined attack on flank or rear, so as to cut off the enemy's communications with Hythe. Besides this a special idea was given to each commander to guide his own individual moves; for instance Colonel McDonald, who had kindly undertaken to defend Dover, had received the following special idea. The troops in the South eastern district had had time to concentrate, and numbered about 11,000 men as detailed. They were to advance from Dover on the 13th of March, and take up a position on the high ground in front of Hortham and Alkham, and to throw out their outposts as far as Swingfield, Evendean, and Stanley. During the night of the 13th, the general commanding hears from trustworthy reports that a strong force of the enemy is advancing upon Dover by the road leading towards Hawkinge, Evendean, and Swingfield. The general is to take up the strongest defensive position near his outposts, and to hold until assistance arrives. After describing the laws of the game, his Royal Highness, before closing mentioned a few instances to show how closely the game in its application approached to what would occur during operations carried on in the field. For instance, a report is sent in from outposts that the enemy is advancing; the commander cannot immediately give his orders to the troops, because the laws of the game states that the aide-de-camp cannot carry orders more rapidly than at a certain pace. He must therefore wait for a certain time before he can remove his pieces. He might make use of signalmen; but the rule is, that unless he has given written orders for the signalmen to be with that corps, time must be allowed for the aide-de-camp to gallop over that distance. Secondly, an officer orders his men to "double" so as to take cover in a wood. The umpire forbids him to "double" more than 200 yards at one move, and never more than three times in right moves. Should they be attacked immediately after "doubling," they receive one chance less than is due to their strength, as they are not then supposed to be so efficient. Having said all that time permitted in explanation of the