

often spoken of by Herbart, but always in the superficial sense. It is a sort of concession of Herbart to the common-sense view of the world, which attributes self-activity to man and animals in the form of spontaneity. He has everwhere, in all his metaphysics, denied self-activity to absolute or essential being. It belongs (self-activity, or the appearance of self-activity), according to him, only to the realm of phenomena. The inherence of properties in a thing, the change of one thing to another, and consciousness of identity under various moods and various ages, all these things are phenomena, but not absolute realities. They are illusions of time and space. Hence, Herbart sees nothing in them that is transcendental, nothing in them that is permanent (see Herbart's Introduction to Philosophy, 1813, and his Encyclopædia of Philosophy of 1831, § 226, and the remark that follows it). Herbart would admit nothing transcendental to the will or to the feeling or to the thinking. Had he perceived that the phenomena of feeling and volition which he enumerated presupposed the transcendental being of the self or personality, and the will, he would have made a different psychology.

In conclusion, I wish to say, with all due emphasis, to the reader of this article, that he should examine himself and ask whether he admits independent self-active being, or whether he considers as admissible only dependent being, or being in the chain of causality which only transmits force without modifying it. If the reader finds himself in the latter class, I advise him earnestly not to deal with the question of free will, because he is not in a condition to admit will of any kind. The object does not exist for him as yet. He has a mental blindness to the spiritual which he should correct first by

thinking out the question of dependent and independent being. Perhaps he will be helped by considering it in this way. My first clearing up of this subject in 1863 arose from considering the three possible results from the following hypotheses, namely: Things are either dependent or independent. If dependent, they demand other being as essential for their existence, and any whole system of being must be independent being, because there is nothing for it to depend on outside of it. Now, all being, whether dependent or independent, must be either determined by itself or by something else. That is to say, it must receive its nature or constitution from some other being, or else originate by its own activity its several traits of character. If originated by another being, and supported by that other being, it is dependent, and it belongs to the independent being which creates and supports it. Independent being or any whole system of being therefore implies self-determination, self-activity, as its only possible form.

Hence we may conclude logically that all being, real or possible, in the universe, is either self-determined being or a result or product of independent being and dependent upon it.

Having settled this, that all ultimate and true being is self-determined being, one is certain that anything or any process in the objective world is a manifestation in the last analysis of self-determined being.

Then one may investigate the forms of self-activity, admitting it wherever he observes action with design, as in the case of the plant, the animal, and man. Plato made these distinctions and started this inquiry. His thought was adopted by Aristotle, and further discriminations were made in it. Great thinkers all the way down, such as Aquinas, Leibnitz, Hegel, Rosen-