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r-transpo B. Ontario and Quebec, in particular, impeding maintain a substantial permanent and crossial presence in the United States. Been them, the ten provincial governof coursets a counted during the early 1970s ffect of 18 trade and investment offices in New n cumula k. Boston, Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveuence. W. Minneapolis-St. Paul, Los Angeles, state inter Francisco, Dallas and New Orleans. s of the tough two provincial offices have ree has been closed, there does not seem to 1970-74 ny mounting trend towards restriction. nts in the have also been threats by Ontario nvironne Alberta, following the U.S. economic and genees of August 1971, to establish their

and transpiers provincial cabinet ministers were such intering on official visits abroad at an ormal age fate of almost one visit every four integration dar days. Moreover, the frequency of such a regularity such a regularity such a regularity such a regularity such as the such a d. There is dian provinces also increased; in r informal 74 these were occurring at the averconditions at of one a week. While not all of these involved the U.S., a good number did. over, the political visiting has not ion of head restricted to mere routine matters. rnment: Washington to lobby directly for key ncial interests: Ross Thatcher (Saslewan) in 1969 to fight tariffs on n provinces in Gerald Regan (Nova Scotia) in yard Island to protest countervailing duties on learning times, and Dave Barrett (British closer enembia) in 1973 to promote a railway ation as that ansporting Arctic gas to U.S. markets. e. They while these types of provincial activity Warre 1, it themselves necessarily represent a a thire jor challenge, their political implica-New Bun are quite clear. In short, the provinces will almost certainly continue to demand an increasingly greater role in national policy-making vis-à-vis the United States. Most, if not all, provincial officials would agree with the former Ontario official, quoted earlier, who also argued: "If a federation such as Canada's is to have national policies, they must be developed by means of a federal-provincial partnership. To an increasing extent, I believe this same partnership should apply in the formation of critical international policies that will affect all levels of government across the country." "Nowhere," he added, "is the importance of the federal-provincial consultative process in the development of foreign policy more clearly illustrated than in our relations with the United States."

If this federal-provincial "consultation" should work to the satisfaction of all concerned, then potentially-serious consequences are not inevitable. The likelihood of such an easy solution, however, is, in our judgment, extremely small. The forces that have given rise to greater provincial activity, and certainly those we have discussed here, are not short-term ones. Nor are the divergent interests they have in part reinforced and in part created likely to be managed by mere consultation. To the extent that these forces prevail, therefore, we do not think it an exaggeration to say that they point to fundamental challenges to the present patterns of Canada's federal system and of the country's most important international relationship. That these evolving challenges have been so little appreciated, not only by federal but also by provincial officials, makes a successful adaptation to the new conditions even less certain.

Fundamental challenges to patterns of Canadian federal system

Our two societies are among the 1974, Premey have produced not only prosperity ed over 1 a personal liberty and a possibility ctive legislation social change that is unmatched tive le ; where. In different ways each is ton. Moreowelly province on the diffusion or even an opposely province on the diffusion of the di ely province on of powers, and the organized Departmentsion among them. But neither country

premier; old survive without a widely-shared ington. Description only the common good.

The only thing that could really our future would be the loss that sense of the common good, so t our domestic politics would be of perm anized into a purely adversary pro-cal visiting. That is why we fear sustained l offices abjustion so much, for prolonged pricefrom size eases make it every man for himself. That is why we have been so shaken by the energy crisis, for it brought out the instinct of hoarding in us. That is why sustained unemployment can be so dangerous, for it sets the working against the jobless.

The same reflections apply to the way in which Canada and the United States relate to each other. It is necessary and right that there should always be a careful calculus of interest and constant bargaining between us, but there must also be a sense of the common good, of what advantages us both, of what will make us both grow.

U.S. Ambassador Thomas Enders addressing the Men's Canadian Club of Ottawa, March 23, 1976