

relations to one another, or, more strictly, to exhibit nature and human personality in their relation to the divine unity. But even Metaphysics must beware of *merging* any of these factors of ultimate reality in the others, or losing the distinctions between them. Its task is, while preserving the distinctive character of each, to accomplish their reconciliation, and to see them in their real unity. I have insisted, therefore, upon the integrity of the moral personality: with that, it seems to me, freedom stands or falls. That integrity may be tampered with, as we have found, in either of two ways. Man may be de-personalised either into Nature or into God. The former is the favourite course of recent Determinism, and I have given my reasons for dissenting from it. The greater danger lies, perhaps, in the other direction; and it was here that Edwards and the older Determinists, with a truer metaphysical instinct than their successors, waged the keenest warfare. The relation of man as a free moral personality to God is even more difficult to conceive than his relation to Nature. To think of God as all in all, and yet to retain our hold on human freedom or personality, that is the real metaphysical difficulty. The ultimate reconciliation of divine