

truth in this plausible proposition,—but it has no force when predicated by a confederation where the several Provinces retain a separate and individual existence, or in other words, where there is really no union at all. Of course if they had become united in a Legislative union an injury or injustice to one part would be a detriment to the whole; but it is not so in the case of a confederation, and if we were foolish enough to confederate with the Canadas under the B. N. A. Act a deadly wound might be inflicted on Nova Scotia without causing a pang to Canada. To illustrate this we need not go far. Canada, if we confederate, will assuredly transfer the fisheries to the United States. This would, in my estimation, be as great a calamity to Nova Scotia as the destruction of our coal mines; and yet Canada, so far from feeling the injury, would gain all the advantages of a market in the United States for her raw material and vast agricultural productions, while we should lose one of our most valuable resources. So we perceive that what would be an irreparable loss to Nova Scotia would be a positive gain to Canada.

The Canadas and the Maritime Colonies have different interests, and a system of trade that would benefit the former might prove prejudicial in the extreme to the latter. Therefore, before we confederate we should look ahead, and if we find that in the House of Commons, elected on the basis of population, we must, even with the assistance of New Brunswick, be in a minority of 147, we would be unwise to confederate. We could not deny the justness of representation by population in the Lower Branch, but we could deny the wisdom of committing our rights and liberties to the mercy of a Legislative Assembly, in which though justly represented according to our population, we were not effectually or virtually represented at all.

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SENATE.

But look at the constitution of the Senate!

When the States of America confederated, the justness of representation by population was admitted, but the effect of small States confederating with larger and more populous ones, had there been no way of devising a means of restoring the equilibrium of power that would have been disturbed by the preponderating influence of the larger States, would have made a Confederation under a General Legislature impossible. The really great statesmen who framed the Constitution devised a method, and the only practicable one, of compensating the small States for the necessary inferiority in the lower Branch by giving them a correspondingly greater influence in the Senate. OREGON, therefore, when she was admitted into the Union with 50,000 inhabitants, and got one representative in the lower Branch, received as many senators as New York with 4,000,000 of population, and consequently 33 representatives in the House of Representatives.