

expences †." But this is a very shallow argument, for, have we not, Sir, the same right to ask, and the same possibility (the author implies no more) of a power, to insist on an indemnification as well by retaining any other conquest as Canada? Most certainly we have, and most certainly we ought, to make our preference subordinate to our own interests and not the convenience of an enemy. The other part of the argument is said to be "the difficulty the French themselves will be under of retaining their restless subjects in America from encroaching on our limits, and disturbing our trade, and the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge ‡." But as this part entirely depends on the objects of our demands in North America, and in fact would be the only material foundation for us to keep Canada, I shall consider that point pretty largely. I do not mean to insist merely on the disadvantages of the commerce of Canada, my intention is not to cavil upon particulars, but to obviate every cause for it hereafter. If the possession of Canada would give us that security we want, or, at least, ought to want, in North America, or would prove of any great detriment to the future growth of power in France, I would readily wave them as inconsiderable. I do not think either of these will be the consequence, and shall presently give my reasons why I think so; and if it is found that Canada will not give us such security, wherefore should we incumber ourselves with it, when it would prove a dead load of expence to us? and wherefore should we pay such a regard to the French, when it would prove a dead load of expence to them? It could

† Interest of Great Britain, p. 5.

‡ Ibid.