

with several countries at one time. I think the United States, for instance, was able to negotiate at one time with some ten or twelve countries. Other countries with smaller delegations had perhaps two or three tariff teams. Canada had one tariff team, and while that meant very intensive and steady work in connection with the tariff negotiations, it had the advantage that the team was a cohesive unit and we at least did not have to have a meeting each night to see what each other had received or given away during the day. We worked together all day, every day.

For the most part the negotiations were conducted in English, but naturally certain negotiations with France and the French colonies, and to some extent with the countries of what is now known as "Benelux" which is the customs union of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, French was used as much as English. With respect to one or two South American countries, we used English part of the time, French part of the time, and Spanish in circumstances where the other team was not able to use French or English, particularly as to the technical language of tariff items.

Just as you have now examined Mr. Deutsch regarding the text of the agreement, and now wish to examine Mr. Kemp and myself regarding the details, it might be well to keep in mind that within our own delegation there was just a two-way division of responsibility and labour. I emphasized yesterday in my opening remarks that I was regarded as the chief of the negotiating team because of age and experience; it was Mr. Kemp's responsibility and that of his colleagues from the Department of Trade and Commerce, as representing the branch of government interested in securing exports for Canada, to determine what our team should ask for, from whom and by how much. Naturally, in making his decision about what we should ask for in any particular commodity from any particular country he had also the advice of specialists from such departments as the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Fisheries. Once he had decided what he would ask for, and had presented his case, it then lay upon us as a team to decide at the end of the day how far the other country had been forthcoming in meeting Mr. Kemp's request, and to appraise the result generally, and then it fell to my side of the team to determine how Canada would pay for the concession that we were receiving; in other words, what reduction should be made in the Canadian tariff as a quid pro quo for what we were receiving either on that particular commodity or in general if we looked at the agreement as a whole.

Now, sir, since this is in a sense horse-trading, one could not always put his whole case on the table before the other team. Both sides had to use the trading instinct, and each had to make up its own mind when it had pushed a request as far as was reasonably possible and practicable to push it; and when that point was reached, decide how much if anything should be given in return. As a general rule, the technique of all negotiating teams was to press their demands upon the other country first, and consider what they would give in payment only after they had heard the reply of the other country. I think that would be the technique followed by most traders, Mr. Chairman, in dealing with any commodity, or even in trading horses. You want to know first what you may get. There is sometimes the disposition to make the offer first. If you make the offer first, then of course the onus is on you of immediately deciding what the situation is when you get the reply to the offer. I mention that because of the fact that the United States technique, as I think is pretty well understood, was to make offers. I should explain that the reason that was the case with the United States more than with any other country was that their teams were definitely restricted in the extent to which they could or might go, no matter what they might get; because the President himself is limited in the extent to which he can make a concession to another country, regardless of the concession