

But that does not answer the main question: is it also a requirement of Western policy to do everything possible, short of war, even if it may risk war, to weaken and destroy and replace the Chinese Communist government as implacably hostile to us, and as irrevocably tied to Moscow in the international Communist conspiracy? That is one question. Or are we to consider the Peking government as another Communist government - like the governments of the U.S.S.R., or Czechoslovakia or Roumania - a government which the Chinese people themselves have accepted for good or ill, in which our concern is not with their internal system of government but only with the question of the extent to which these governments may pursue aggressive military policies?

The differing answers to these two questions, on both sides of the Atlantic, point up and underline the seriousness of the problem and the danger of division over it.

Only this morning a distinguished and powerful United States leader is reported as saying, (and I quote from the press, realizing, of course, that quotations of this kind are sometimes taken out of context and may sometimes give the wrong impression): "We should do our best, that is, the United States, to negotiate a Korean truce and if we fail, then let England and our other allies know that we are withdrawing from all further peace negotiations in Korea." He went on: "I believe we might as well abandon any idea of working with the United Nations in the East and reserve to ourselves a completely free hand."

All I can say is that if this should become the United States policy, it would be deplorable, I think, and a great blow to co-operation in the Pacific, and certainly a great blow to the United Nations, which, as I see it, still remains our best hope for the ultimate solution of these political problems which now so tragically divide the world. And, incidentally, in this interdependent age a free hand is pretty difficult for any state, however powerful, to secure. Yet, though we might have differing views on this kind of statement, it surely would be a very great mistake, and worse, a tragedy, if we got too wrought up over it or replied to it in irritable or controversial terms. Surely it is far more important to find out why this feeling prevails in certain quarters, in certain very responsible and some moderate quarters in the United States, and then try to get together and see what we can do to remove this difference of viewpoint and policy.

Some light on these difficulties may, I think, be thrown by our experiences in trying to negotiate an armistice in Korea. It is a very good case history in respect of this problem.

The truce negotiations in Korea, which have been going on for such a long time now, have been both difficult and delicate. They have been conducted with very great