

### Possible Future Extensions of Confidence-Building Measures

Many of the numerical thresholds introduced into the CSBMs negotiated by the CSCE were chosen for the circumstances of Europe in the late stages of the Cold War. In coming years the sizes of military forces in Europe will be considerably lower, and problems arising in other parts of the world are likely to involve forces of different sizes and character than those of Europe in the 1980s. For example, alterations can be made to the sizes of military exercises for which notifications or invitations for observation are prescribed. Exemptions for short-notice "alert" exercises could be removed. More provisions could be introduced for the explanation of "unusual military activity."

Where there are areas that are the focus of some sort of crisis, or known to be of particular sensitivity for inter-ethnic conflict, a measure could be introduced to limit out-of-garrison activities, or the presence of offensive-type weapons.

Where there is suspicion regarding the development of some new type of weapon system, voluntary invitations can be extended for observers to visit demonstrations or attend tests.

More information could be included in exchanges of data regarding defence plans and budgets.

Unless and until some arrangements are made for verification of the BTWC, much will depend on its confidence-building measures. Experiences with the implementation of the CWC should be helpful in this regard. As (and if) confidence is built, and as methods of analysis and detection improve, there could be a gradual transition from confidence-building to verification.

While the Open Skies Treaty of 1992 has great potential for confidence-building, covers a very large area, and may be converted to verification

at a later date, it is a regional arrangement and does not exploit the full capability of aerial reconnaissance. But the potential of aerial surveillance as a generic means of obtaining accurate, detailed, up-to-date information about things and activities at a remote locality is very significant for confidence-building, verification, non-proliferation and the support of peace operations, especially if no restrictions are placed on the airborne sensors.

There is a great scope for further extension of confidence-building through aerial monitoring in regional arrangements among the less wealthy and industrialized states. The vehicles and the technology are far more accessible than surveillance from space, and the acts of observation are much less intrusive than on-site inspections on the ground.<sup>8</sup>

There are likely to be opportunities for confidence-building measures in the maritime dimension. Examples would be dissemination of information on naval exercises and naval weapon systems, invitations to attend naval manoeuvres, restrictions on entry into specified maritime "keep-out" zones, or transit through certain passages. Arrangements can be made for dealing with provocative or dangerous behaviour at sea.

If a treaty were agreed establishing arms control in space of a character much more restrictive than the Outer Space Treaty, it would require provisions for adequate verification. However, unless and until such a treaty is put into force—or if the Antibalistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were to be annulled—there will still be a legitimate desire by states to know if weapons are being put into space, or being designed to attack vehicles in space. Arrangements to demonstrate that vehicles about to be launched into space do not contain weapons, or that devices projecting energy into space are not able to damage satellites would constitute useful confidence-building measures. Specific measures could include notifications regarding

<sup>8</sup> See Michael Krepon and Amy Smithson (eds), *Open Skies, Arms Control and Cooperative Security* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

