

frustrating delays he encountered in establishing an aid program for Southeast Asia. Spender's "brutal and eccentric" tactics in pursuit of what eventually became the Colombo Plan were deeply resented in Ottawa.³⁰

The tense international situation left little room for such disputes. Growing allied tension over the strategy to be pursued in response to Chinese intervention in the Korean War threatened the Anglo-American harmony upon which both Canada's and Australia's foreign policy was predicated. A new Australian minister of external affairs, R.G. Casey, set out to tackle this problem when he was appointed to his post in the spring of 1951. An experienced diplomat, who had served in both London and Washington, Casey possessed a clear conception of the role that Canada and Australia might play in the Anglo-American relationship. He lost no time in making Pearson aware of his views:

There is a wide field of potential cooperation and understanding between Australia and Canada, in which our two countries, working together, could be an effective force for the reconciliation of interests between the United States and Britain and an element of stability in the United Nations and the world in general.³¹

Although Pearson was amused by Casey's "old Etonian, striped-pants manner," he was charmed and impressed by the Australian's "almost Boswellian ingenuousness."³² Pearson's advisors in Ottawa, where Casey regularly visited en route to and from the United Nations, were also captivated by the Australian's "forthcoming and pleasant manner."³³

The close relationship that developed between Casey and Pearson provided the basis for a stable partnership whose effects lasted well into the 1960s. For the Australian foreign minister, whose country's isolated location prompted an enduring fear that its Anglo-American allies might become too focused on the Soviet threat in Europe, Pearson became an important source of information on developments in NATO. In exchange, Casey regularly sent Pearson copies of his confidential diaries containing frank comments on his travels through Asia and on discussions in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A succession of crises in Asia provided a host of opportunities for bilateral cooperation. For instance, when Canada agreed to sit on the three international control commissions established in 1954 as part of an effort to contain conflict in Indochina, contacts between Australian and Canadian representatives became "very close and continual."³⁴ Casey and Pearson also came to form the core of a small group of powers that quietly sought a solution to one of the principal obstacles to Asian stability, Communist China's continued exclusion from the international community.