



United States has recently made a comprehensive proposal, although it is distressing that the Soviet Union, which holds the major stock of chemical weapons in Europe, has rejected it. The key difficulty in dealing with chemical weapons is, of course, verification, not the zone. Similarly, we are convinced that the question of military budgets should be tackled at the United Nations in line with Sweden's proposals for a technical reporting system.

Putting aside then these inappropriate and misplaced elements, what is left in proposal SC.4? Like the other proposals on the table, it calls for the negotiation of confidence-building measures which would be more significant in nature and broader in scope than those in the Final

Act based on the experience in implementing these Helsinki-type measures. While I do not intend today to comment on these specific measures, I can commend the intention of expanding on the confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

The last remaining proposal in SC.4 calls for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty member States. This is characterized as — and I quote — 'a major confidence-building measure.' Is it?

The commitment not to use force is already enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. At

the NATO Summit in Bonn in 1982, Western leaders pledged that their weapons would never be used except in response to attack. Last December, NATO Foreign Ministers renewed this pledge in the Brussels declaration.

Still, the Warsaw Pact persists in proposing some kind of non-aggression treaty as it did following the meeting of its Foreign Ministers in Prague in January 1983. The Canadian Government concluded that the proposal was unlikely to lead to the successful negotiation of meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements. However, since the proposal has been advanced again, we will look at it again. In this assessment, our guideline will be whether it could lead to a reduction in the current level of East-West tension and to the successful negotiation of meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements.

Certainly non-aggression is a valid principle, and the aim of this Conference, as spelled out in the mandate, is to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. The mandate directs us to accomplish this by undertaking new, effective and concrete actions.

The proposal for a treaty on the non-use of military force is not new — it is a relic out of the museum of diplomatic failures. It is not concrete — it is simply a renewed declaration. It is questionable whether it would be effective — it only has to be breached once.

What *would* be effective is a series of CSBMs which, provided with adequate forms of verification, would constitute means of observing preparations for aggression before the principle was breached.

We have before us on the table, Mr. Chairman, four proposals which in varying degrees include elements of what I might call disincentives to aggression which could break out due to misperception of intentions or miscalculation of results. In this sense, the areas of congruence among the proposals are considerable.



*A commitment to regularly notify and invite observation of routine military exercises will help demonstrate their non-hostile intent.*

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