

judge, it is not for me to say that there is anything compromising in the thesis, whatever may befall the unworthy individual selected to work it out.

The way of the reformer, like that of the transgressor, is hard. And when I look back at the several educational reforms whose inauguration I have taken part in on the floor and from the platform of the conventions of our Association, and consider the few fragments of popularity if any that are left to me, I cannot but marvel at my own temerity in undertaking to bring to your notice a subject which is pregnant with more reforms than the youngest of us is ever likely to see realized. And yet, since the uttering of the truth is never permanently compromising to him who stands up for the true dictates of reform, and as I trust I have native discretion enough to keep away from the particular sufficiently far to save you from the accusation of giving heed to politics or personalities in your conventions, I again crave your forbearance with my utterances on education in your hearing.

When speaking of the duty of the State towards education as a necessary relationship in a well-ordered community, very few of us take time to distinguish between the State or nation which is organic and personal, and the state of commonwealth which is empirical and changeable. The vocation of the one is humanity, the vocation of the other is for protection. And it is needless to say, at the very outset, that we Canadians, with only the possibilities of our becoming a nation in sight, must take note of this distinction more than the older communities of the world, whose nationhood has long been matured, when we ask what the duty of the State is toward education.

And how am I to make this distinction clear to all, especially to those of you who resent having anything said in your hearing which for the moment you do not fully comprehend? Philosophy has often amused itself by seeking to work out an analogy between the body politic and a living, individual body. Plato in his "Republic" points out the parallelisms between the "reason" in man and the civil powers that formulate the functions of government, between the "will" of man and the executive that fulfils these functions, and between the human "passions" and the populace engaged in the pursuit of gain and pleasure. Hobbes, the father of modern philosophy, carries the analogy to a further point of interest to us by referring to that great leviathan called a commonwealth or State as a great artificial man, with its supreme sovereignty for an artificial "soul," with its judicature as artificial "joints," its system of rewards and punishments for "nerves," its wealth-producing resources as its "strength," and the "salus populi" or the people's safety as its "business." But none of these philosophic recreations brings nearer the great philosophic truth that the State or nation is a divinely designed organism, a personality making for morality, than the parallel lines so patiently and beautifully traced by Herbert Spencer in his essay on the "Social Organism." Were there time I would like to indicate how that philosopher finds his way along the lower vegetal and animal organisms into the higher as a guidance in his identification of the State as an organism developing in the same way from the elemental forms of family and tribal government to the complexities of a British or American constitution. But a clue is all that we want for our present purpose, and