

succeeded in meeting the present situation; if, in spite of our efforts, there should be some trouble developing, we might be obliged to prevent ships from sailing, to prevent rioting, etc., and I would like him to understand this in advance. I added that we had taken steps to ask the press, on grounds of high policy, to leave the matter alone, and that I also intended to call in the B.C. members of Parliament; explain wherein our position which had been taken to relieve their local situations, was being misunderstood in Japan; advise them of the government's action and ask them to support the government in having the position properly explained to their constituents, should any questions arise.

Mr. Yoshizawa said he was very pleased to learn what the government had decided in the matter, and that he would cable his government immediately. He asked me pointedly about the British Ambassador sharing the view of our Minister [Chargé d'Affaires]. I told him that that certainly was correct, that our Minister had so advised us in one of his communications. That I felt sure Great Britain was most anxious to avoid any action being taken either by Britain herself or Canada which would embarrass relations between Japan and the United Kingdom at this time.

Mr. Yoshizawa left with me a typewritten copy of a communication dated Dec. 17 last<sup>1</sup> he had given to E[xternal] A[ffairs] some time ago concerning Canada's restrictions on trade. He also was careful to emphasize the Japanese Government understood the restrictions on metals required for war purposes and raised no question in that connection. It was wheat and wood which had made them feel there must be some ulterior motive. He told me before he left that there was a radical element in Japan that were trying to give the impression that the British were seeking to starve the Japanese. I said that nothing could be more unfair than that. I also told him that the fact we had stopped shipments at the time when we had plenty of grain, and when we knew the U.S. were still making shipments to Japan was an evidence that it was the local situation in B.C. that we were primarily concerned with, not the question of withholding these supplies from Japan.

The Minister also spoke of [there] having been heated words at one discussion between our Chargé d'Affaires and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs when the latter said something about the possibility of not continuing diplomatic relations as there was no further trade. I replied that trade or no trade, we wanted the diplomatic relations just to deal with situations such as he had brought out; to see that friendly relations were maintained and that no misunderstanding took place. I pointed out how all my efforts over many years—as he and others know—had been to prevent misunderstanding between the two countries.

He said it would be well if we appointed a Minister.<sup>2</sup> If we appointed a Minister to Brazil and Argentina before appointing one to Japan, that might

<sup>1</sup> Document 1233.

<sup>2</sup> Voir le volume 7, les documents 145-155.

<sup>2</sup> See Volume 7, Documents 145-55.